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Pillars of the Republic


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Pillars of the Republic

By Maenor Aildhuin

Written in 1804; Karosgrad.

 

 

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Dedicated to all the Mali’thill who had to flee their homes in the wake of oppression.

 

Preface

 

A republic refers to a form of government where the power is held by the people and their elected representatives. Generally, the positions of power within such a system are not hereditary and none wield absolute powers like a king would in a monarchy. Simultaneously, the means of acquiring such primary positions differ slightly, however it is the wish of the author to dive into one particular type of republic, the democratic republic, wherein the citizenry elects representatives through equal, direct and secret vote.

 

Further in this book, the broad definition put forth shall be expanded upon and, it is hoped, communicate the dogmas any democratic republic must abide by in order to properly operate in service of the people. Another of the author’s wishes is to understand the mistakes of the modern iteration of the Silver State and why it fundamentally failed as a democratic entity and, in the spirit of progress, enunciate the changes so needed for its revival and actual performance.

 

I. The Fundamentals of Democratic Republics

 

The vitality of any democratic republic manifests through the elections and their honesty for any position of leadership. All governmental positions must be acquired only through fair elections regardless of the circumstances the nation finds itself in. Elections can never be skipped over. Furthermore, for the healthy development of such systems and for ensuring their longevity, there must exist strong and secure institutions in which elected officials with relatively little individual power operate for the benefit of the nation and its inhabitants. There must be mechanisms of regulation and correction should any of the country’s stewards fail in their duties or attempt abuse or seizure of power. This is usually achieved through the separation and distribution of power across multiple institutions or persons, preventing one from holding total control and offering the system the means to correct should anyone err. The law must reign supreme and, so far as democracies are concerned, it must unequivocally be respected and, should it be disregarded by an individual, regardless of status, it must be enforced without bias or prejudice. The law must guarantee the sanctity of the rights of the individual and the respect for such indisputably at all times. A democracy must ensure that all the citizens have a voice. Those that are wrong or dumb must be listened to and then destroyed with logical arguments, taught so they see the light, ridiculed should they stubbornly cling to erroneous affirmations.  Justice through comprehensive laws, freedom through a constitution made for the people, equality through understanding and mutual respect, those are the premises of a successful democratic republic.

 

However, laws can be changed. The ruling body can be manipulated. It is, as shown by recent Haelun’orian politicians, relatively easy to twist the public opinion to your benefit, to profit off their concerns and to direct all hatred at an external or internal enemy, be it fictional or real to some degree, be them liberals, impures, other Mali’thill etcetera. At this point it is important to note that in a democratic republic, the most powerful entity, the one that really dictates the nation’s future, is the citizenry. Should the people demand malevolence, the leaders must obey to retain their positions, regardless of whether or not their beliefs align with those of the people. But that is right. Ultimately, it is the people that decide the fate of their country; it is the people that lead it to glory or to ruin. Is there anything more just than that? As such, to ensure the good will of the people, you do not entrust the leadership with veto power, for what are the politicians, if not the mirrored image of the citizenry? For the progress of the republic and for the power of the people to be wielded wisely, the masses must be educated. The backbone of any democracy is the knowledgeable society. Parasites and other abominations can never take the reigns of power in such collectives. They are weeded out, they do not meet the requirements and expectations of intelligent beings that understand key values such as the collective good and the ineffable nature of their rights. The rights of the individual are not granted by the state or by the constitution, the rights are intrinsic to the person by virtue of mere existence. It is up to the individual if it wishes for its rights to manifest or for them to be respected by the state and constitution. Such persons are, courtesy of their intelligence and education, less prone to be fooled by populistic or extremist speeches meant to arouse the most barbaric and primal of emotions for the politician to exploit. In such cases when the well-educated masses are tasked with electing their representatives, their honest demands and expectations will simply rid the political stage of any ill-willing individuals, thus the mechanisms of the republic are entrusted not in the hands of impure extremists, but in those of the learned with a solemn respect for the voice of the people and their rights, for the well-being of the nation and for the progress of their kin through unity and plurality of opinions.

 

The existence of a plurality of opinions is another fundamental aspect of an actual democratic establishment. Democracy means that one listens to all the sides, not just the one that appeals to one the most. The quintessence of the democratic republic can be surmised by the following mantra: I will fight to the death for your right to disagree with me. The plurality of opinions is so vital to an educated democratic society for it opens up possibilities, presents new approaches to problems and offers a multitude of solutions. It is a path to innovation, to progress. It is what sound republics use to find the best course of action. Among many voices, one, at least, is bound to be correct. The disregard for this fundamental aspect of a democracy leads to one of the greatest dangers to such a state, to what is usually called tyranny of the majority. We can observe the effects of such a weakness of the system on the nation and the population in the current Silver State, where such a phenomenon is in full effect, one of the many driving forces behind the recent exodus of the Mali’thill. What happens in such cases is that the majority, dismissing the wants and needs of the minority, proceeds to pursue primarily its own goals and motives. This leads to governmental complacency, corruption, to a shortage of new ideas and a massive echo chamber. To maintain this tyranny means the minority ends up oppressed, much as it would in a tyrannical system, which ends up leading to discontent. This, in turn, coupled with the appearance of a lost battle, with the impossibility of success and reform, leads the minority, which, however small, still represents a considerable part of the state’s population, to turn to new horizons, to seek shelter elsewhere. To counter this inadequacy of the system there mainly needs to be in place a functional and efficacious educational system that renders the masses educated. Learned individuals are more likely to listen to the other side, more likely to concede to the more reasonable argument, to work together with the opponent in search of the best solution, in search of compromise and in search of progress. They are prone to putting the general good above their own personal ambitions. The pairing of great knowledge and wisdom with a propitious constitution, one that pledges to secure the rights of the person, allowing the minority to have a voice to begin with, is what efficiently deters the degrading of the democracy into a tyranny of the majority. Education, freedom of speech and of thought, freedom of the press and generally the liberty to do and speak as one sees fit will all beget a great deal of voices within the society, a most vital aspect of the system.

 

II. Constructing the Republican System

 

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[!] Painting of the first Silver Council meeting after the Fall of the Diarchy

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The actual building of a democratic republic is by no means an easy feat, even for Mali’thill. It takes many years to get used to the burden of freedom, to grasp the mechanisms of the democratic institutions and the liberties the citizen is entitled to, especially if the system is attempted after a long period of dictatorship. The nation also must be in possession of individuals capable of reforming or recreating the system into one of a free republic. There are many things that can go wrong, and the infancy of the system is when it finds itself in the most peril. In this chapter, I shall attempt to lay down the immediate reforms a nation must generally embrace while undergoing the transition to a democratic system as well as civil rights and liberties the government and the law must respect and protect at all times. In essence, this part would serve as a common guideline for aspiring democratic republics.

 

Presuming the individuals capable of reforming the system end up seizing the reigns of power, the first step in the endeavor would be establishing a constitution that serves the citizenry, one that protects their ineradicable rights and their freedoms to individually express themselves. One propitious for a democratic system would usually begin with a definition of the state followed by that of the citizen, subtly hinting at its importance for the nation. Here, the constitution also ought to make it clear how exactly one does become a citizen. In an ideal democracy, not too many restrictions are imposed.

 

“A citizen of Haelun’or shall be defined as a High Elf who is pure of mind and body, and who has been guaranteed a place in the city either by writ of citizenship issued by the Okarir’hiylun or Tilruir’lin, or by naturalization by birth to two High Elven citizens on Haelun’or soil.”

Excerpt from the 1774 Constitution of Haelun’or; Art. I, S. I. Definition of Citizen

 

Then the constitution must list the rights of the individual. Mind you, as stated before, the constitution itself does not create those rights, they have already existed and been claimed by the individual. The constitution lists them primarily to reinforce these otherwise intangible possessions of the self and to anchor them in the context of the law, rendering the state open to criticism or denunciation should they be infringed. The most vital rights and liberties of the individual that need to be secured by a democratic constitution would be the freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, the right to vote, to fair trial, to self-defense, to medical service, protection and the right to petition the government. Maintaining these natural rights of the individual steadfastly secures its position in society and in relation to the state. It institutes the frame of reference wherein the citizen can operate and manifest itself. If we are to look at history, the death of any democratic republic begins with the disregard for the citizens’ rights.

 

“All High Elven citizens of Haelun’or shall be guaranteed the unalienable rights to freedom of expression, to enter the city freely, to association, to attend trials and public councils, to due process under the law, to education and the pursuit of progress, and to housing and food within the City of Haelun’or. “

“All High Elven citizens of the age of majority (50) shall be [...] granted the rights to public debate, to vote in public election, and to run in and challenge any elected office.”

Excerpts from the 1774 Constitution of Haelun’or; Art. I, S. II. Constitutional Rights of Citizens

 

What would naturally follow would be a defining of the democratic institutions and government which operate in the name of the people. In a democratic republic, the power must be spread across multiple institutions and never be allowed to centralize under a single one or a single person. This partition renders the state less prone to decay into tyranny and makes corruption much easier to detect and combat. Note that the separation of powers is not an approach exclusive to republics, but can be found in enlightened monarchies such as Oren or Hanseti-Ruska. Take for example the Orenian government wherein the power of the Crown is divided between the Council of State, Imperial Diet and the Imperial Judiciary. In this particular instance, the division is made in three branches: the executive, the legislative and the judiciary; this tripartite division is perhaps the most common example, and the most effective. It must be maintained that all positions of power be filled only after fair elections and that the citizens’ voice must never be ignored. Once the attributes of all institutions with their respective constituents and positions have been written down, the constitution must explicitly state how the nation is governed and how the branches of power interact with one another. In the context of the tripartite system, the legislative creates the laws, the executive puts the laws into effect, the judiciary interprets and defends the laws. How precisely laws are introduced and how the constitution can be amended must also be mentioned. After witnessing the butchering of the democratic Haelun’orian constitution and its replacement with one dictatorial in nature, I personally advise that for all constitutional amends, a referendum must be held wherein the approval or disapproval of the citizenry is asked in regards to the proposed modifications. Once that is done, one can consider the constitution complete.

 

Afterwards, the legal step towards a democracy is nigh on finished. The government must make sure that the mundane laws do not infringe on the rights of the citizenry, nor that they are irrational or contradictory. The ruling body must make sure that there are no breaches in the law and that, first and foremost, it protects the citizen. The Silver Law would serve as an example of a masterfully crafted legislation.

 

Now, aside from the law, it must be a government’s top priority to establish a coherent educational system immediately. It is only through educating the masses that one can make sure that the aforementioned system put in place lasts. As stressed before, knowledgeable individuals are what prevents vermin from acquiring and, through changes in the law, eventually abusing power. One must understand the weaknesses of any democracy and just how easily it can revert back to tyranny, particularly after long periods of authoritarianism. Do be warned, this is no excuse to purposefully imbue the minds of the masses with propaganda for the better rooting of the democratic system. Fabricated claims and deceit are not the tools of true republics; on the contrary, such forms of government must be guided by the truth and the free will of the citizens.

 

III. The Ruination of the Silver State

 

I will begin by maintaining that the 1774 iteration of the Silver State was not exactly a republic in its true sense, but shall be referred to as such for the sake of simplicity. Coincidentally, the only position in the government not up for elections was also the one to hold the most power. That was not very democratic nor safe for the development of an actual democracy. A better description for the governmental structure of Haelun’or, as laid down in the 1774 Constitution, would be that of an enlightened absolute ruler presiding over a privy council whose members are electable, members that, at the same time, enjoy a relatively high autonomy from the supreme leader. Still, despite all this, the citizens did enjoy more freedom than anywhere else. So far as civil rights and liberties are concerned, Ikur Sullas and Nelgauth Maehr’tehral did a considerably good job, ably reinforcing the voice of the people and their means to speak and make themselves heard. But the fact stands; the Haelun’orian republic was thoroughly flawed.

 

First, let us commence with the obvious: it placed too much power into an unelected head of state.

 

“[...] the Maheral shall have the authority to supervise and veto any legislation passed by the silver council, to pardon any citizen found in violation of Haelun’or law, and to interpret this constitution and declare any current or former legislation unconstitutional. Thus striking it from law permanently. Like the Sohaer, the Maheral shall reserve the right to declare a state of war and peace between Haelun’or and her adversaries, as is necessary to preserve and protect the interests of her people. As part of these rights, the Maheral shall be considered the supreme commander of all military assets in Haelun’or; and be granted the right to manage all political alliances of the state, as well as the right to denounce enemy states and to appoint ambassadors and scribes to act on their behalf. No diplomatic meeting involving Haelun’or may proceed without the consent of the sitting Sohaer or Maheral.”

“Finally, the Maheral reserves the right to exercise complete control over the Silver Council. As part of their office, the Maheral may choose to remove a criminal or non-compliant councilor at any time on the condition that they nominate at least one willing replacement to the position.”

Excerpts from the 1774 Constitution of Haelun’or; Art. III, S. I. Duties and Privileges of The Blessed (Maheral)

 

It must be noted, before we delve deeper into the matter, that fortunately, throughout this establishment’s short existence, the position of Maheral was held either by people with enough foresight and ability not to make use of their godlike powers too often, or by people too incompetent and indecisive. As it happens, the Maheral itself is not the reason the republic fell. Rather, what is of concern is the attempt to fuse authoritarian tradition with democratic values. The half measures of the initial government were grave sources of discontent among the populace. Some were screeching that the nation was too liberal while others complained that it was too dictatorial. The idea itself that you can maintain a democratic republic while also entrusting titanic veto powers to a single position is where the err resides. Considering the fallible nature of the Descendants, supposing that the Maheralship ended up in the wrong hands, the person would have had the ability to end the republic without even having to bother to ask for the citizenry’s consent. The only way to oppose such a ruler would have been if society collectively decided that the person simply ceased to be, a process that, while very generously referred to, especially during Ikur’s final years, was simply not something that could have happened or would have happened realistically. If one had the desire to cling to power, then the position would have granted one the means to defend it, both through law and through force. In fact, every time the decision power of the Maheral was used, it only served to silence dissent and to fuel further discontent which would be later exploited by a treacherous few that ended up destroying the republic entirely. It simply is too dangerous to deliver absolute power to a single individual. It can, even if that person is, allegedly, the highest symbol of purity, corrupt.

 

Other major flaws of the system included the reserved distribution of power, apparent lack of regulatory mechanisms and inability of the populace to intervene in the affairs of the state. In principle, the entire executive, administrative and legislative power was spread out among a handful of council members as well as the Maheral, into whom supreme executive power shall be vested. One might count it as not being distributed at all, since one institution, the heial’thilln, held all of it. The heial’tuva as an institution possessed no power whatsoever, its only attributes could have very well been given to the citizens of the age of majority without the need of an establishment that existed in name only. To make matters worse, the mechanisms of regulation concerning the usage of power existed only if either the Maheral bothered to notice or if the citizen was attentive enough to spot idle councilors. In the latter case, which would have been the most common, all the citizen could do was challenge said representative and hope the incoming elections would not be decided by popularity and bias, which was often the case. With power so condensed into a single entity and its constituent parts being so few, the council meetings wherein the matters of the state were settled seemed dull. Very rarely were there any actual debates among the councilors or plurality of opinions. When it did happen, there was always the option of simply removing the noncompliant individuals. Due to the nature of the Silver Council, the minority was rarely taken into account. The power belonged mostly to a few persons who, for the most part, shared the same thoughts and opinions, very like sheep. Those discontent could either endure or take their grievances to the Maheral or the Okariran in hopes that something would be done. Ofttimes they would receive some half-hearted reassurance and then life would resume as always. This disregard for some voices would, obviously, be exploited later by populists and extremists to seize the reins of power. The way the ruling body of the nation was structured was simply fundamentally wrong, governing the nation undemocratically and on the assumption that those elected would do their job, entrusting the system with very few means of correcting itself should they not do their job. Lasting republics require the hearts and minds of all its citizens, with power fragmented among many entities that only by working together for the betterment of the nation would they achieve progress.

 

This would, more or less, conclude the legislative issues that endangered the republic. But there is still one critical problem that must be addressed. By far the greatest error, in the author’s view, was the inability of the ruling body of enlightening the masses through various educational means. Sadly, during the first couple of decades since the Republic’s foundation, the position of Okarir’maehr, paramount for the healthy societal development and for the progress of democracy, was held by an inept impure. But let us not throw all the blame on one so inferior, for he was voted in and nobody dared to challenge him for twenty years. Here, the absence of regulatory mechanisms have hit hardest. The Eternal institutions were all allowed to fall into disrepair, the public lectures were very scarce and insipid and, overall, the state laid no paths for the people to pursue intellectual progress. Whatever such progress was made, it was all due to individual and independent enterprises. While, throughout this period, the Maheral’s attempts at providing history lessons to the populace were commendable, in the end they were too few which, coupled with the lacking of any meaningful cultural lectures, failed to awaken the conscience of the masses in regards to the democratic process. It must be maintained that, for the citizens to scrupulously tend the democratic system, the teaching of unbiased history and culture is paramount, for only thus can one objectively assess the present and the potential future, comparing them with past actions and mistakes that ought not be repeated, ensuring the cultural progress of the people. But, in the early Republic, the immense potential for progress offered by the structure of the system was obscured by the veil of ignorance that blinded the masses. And when the position was entrusted to someone actually competent, it was too late, the damage was already done. There was too much to fix in too short a time. When populistic and propagandistic notions began circulating, too few people actually had the ability of rejecting them, of not being enslaved by them. Foolishness allowed a band of troglodytes to dismantle the Republic while encountering absolutely no resistance from the inner system. A republic’s greatest defense lies in the people and their voting power. Should they not be properly taught how to use said power responsibly, everything collapses.

 

All these issues, acting in unison, led to the ultimate downfall of the Republic in 1804 and the establishment of a dictatorship under the Sohaer. It is to be hoped that some lessons would be learned from these past occurrences. Exceptional care must be put whenever attempting to establish a democracy as it grants the people freedom. Freedom to end said democracy should they desire and establish tyranny instead. The tragedy of the situation, however, is that the ensuing tyranny does not give the citizens any option of ever reverting peacefully to a democracy.

 

IV. A Silver Republic

 

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[!] Painting of the Silver Council proclaiming the Republic

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Devising a functioning Haelun’orian republic is particularly challenging considering that it must respect democratic principles while also following the established traditions of the Mali’thill. Nevertheless, for the sake of progress, an attempt shall be made. One would notice, however, that neither this proposal is a republic in its true sense, but will still attempt to do it justice. For this part, the Constitution of 1774 shall be used as a reference point as the current Haelun’orian Constitution is beyond saving.

 

In regards to the Maheral, it who simply is, in the past Republic, has been hailed as the ultimate symbol of purity, as Larihei’s messenger and, as such, has been entrusted absolutist powers. While this might be true, history teaches us to be more prudent before making such claims. As we have seen with the last Maheral, they too can err, they too can lie and deceive shamelessly. Some would say that such a person who acts in disservice to maehr’sae hiylun’ehya is not Maheral. But such a saying would hardly be taken seriously. And, in the end, why give one who could potentially not be fit for Maheralship such unlimited powers? Why content yourself with only hoping that the position will be filled by someone worthy? In an actual republic, the Maheral’s role ought to be that of guidance, of teaching and of preserving the culture; not at all that of a king. The Maheral of the Silver State shall remain its head of state but without any veto power, for that could potentially be used to obstruct progress or silence the will of the people. It shall preside over all council meetings and supervise that only actions for the progress of the state and its citizens are taken. As before, the Maheral should be able to select a Maelunir upon their ascension who it can replace at any time. The purpose of the Maheral in the heial’thilln would be that of ensuring that the legislation created is in accordance with tradition and maehr’sae hiylun’ehya. However, the Maheral ought not be allowed to vote nor to propose legislation of its own. To better distribute power, an alternative way for the Maheral, as a tool of the system, to regulate the activity of the council would be for it to be able, instead of having veto power over legislation, to postpone the enactment of a new law should it consider it against purity and progress, and send it to the heial’tuva for approval. For all controversial laws where the sanctity of the nation might be in danger, the ultimate authority must be the people. Let them decide via a simple majority referendum whether the legislation sent by the Maheral passes or not. That way, the possibilities of exploiting the system drastically diminish and the citizens gain a voice in the more complex affairs of the state. Additionally, in the case of the Maheral deeming a law, already approved, unconstitutional, a similar process should ensue. Instead of being able to permanently strike down said law, the Maheral would petition the heial’tuva and ask their opinion via simple majority referendum. Again, the purpose of such maneuvers is to distribute power across multiple institutions in an effort of consolidating democracy and reducing the risk of oppression. The Maheral also must not have the power to remove councilors from council meetings, lest that be abused to silence discontent. But other than that, the Maheral would preside over all elections and referendums and guarantee the legality of ballots and have “the right to declare a state of war and peace between Haelun’or and her adversaries, as is necessary to preserve and protect the interests of her people. As part of these rights, the Maheral shall be considered the supreme commander of all military assets in Haelun’or; and be granted the right to manage all political alliances of the state, as well as the right to denounce enemy states and to appoint ambassadors and scribes to act on their behalf. No diplomatic meeting involving Haelun’or may proceed without the consent of the sitting Sohaer or Maheral”, as laid down in the Constitution of 1774. The Most Blessed ought also to retain its primary role in the heial’laurir and have an ultimate say in a Path to Purity sentence as the position still must retain its cultural importance.

 

Concerning the Sohaer, it must be chair of the Silver Council and the steward of the nation. The Sohaer and the Maheral must complement each other to secure a prosperous future for the nation and its inhabitants. To begin, the power entrusted to the Sohaer according to the 1774 Constitution is, by all accounts, reasonable. As such, I would not take away any of its attributes formulated in the Article II, Section IV Duties and Privileges of the Devout (The Sohaer) (Constitution of 1774).  However, as some have argued, it does not enforce the idea that the Devout is the nation’s steward and head of government. Thus, I would instead add to its abilities in relation to the rest of the government, granting it a firmer grip over the administration. Consider the following:  should the Sohaer deem an Okarir unworthy of serving the nation, it should have the ability, similar to the Maheral, to petition the heial’tuva for a vote of confidence of said Okarir, simple majority deciding if the elected official loses its position or not. In this manner, the Sohaer does not have to patiently wait for some brave soul to challenge said Okarir and replace it. It grants the steward of the nation, in collaboration with the citizenry, better control of the system. And afterall, a vacant seat is a preferable alternative to one occupied by an incompetent or a malevolent creature. In addition, and with the purpose of fitting the position of Medi’ir into the democratic republic, upon its ascension, the Sohaer would select one Medi’ir that would thenceforth preside over the heial’tuva. It is fitting that a smaller Sohaer should preside over a smaller institution. But, to prevent corruption and servile behaviours, there must be restrictions in regards to the Sohaer demoting said Medi’ir. Preferably, the only routes of the Sohaer vacating the seat of Medi’ir would be those of either the incumbent Sohaer losing the position, a new Sohaer entailing a new Medi’ir or the Devout requesting the removal of the Medi’ir to the heial’tuva, it being removed by a two-thirds majority vote. The reasoning here behind the necessity of the heial’tuva’s approval is, again, the attempt at curbing corruption and preventing the political monopoly of the Sohaer. It seems reasonable that the ones with the final say in the matter should be those over which the Medi’ir holds sway. Now, due to the relation the position of Medi’ir would have with the general populace and the members of the heial’tuva, we must be delicate in ascertaining power to it, lest the balance tips and the Council of Many gains the ability to undermine the Silver Council. But at the same time, we must remain aware that the Medi’ir, in this case, ought to magnify the voice of the people. Thus, in this Silver Republic, I would entrust the Medi’ir with one ability only, one not to be taken lightly. To anchor within the legislative the saying that the Maheral ceases to be if the citizens stop following it, the Medi’ir would have the option of organizing a referendum to decide whether or not one simply is or simply is not. Four-fifths majority in the heial’tuva would determine that the Maheral ceases to be. However, to prevent abuses of such power, should the vote fail and the Maheral to remain, the Medi’ir forfeits its position, the Sohaer being required to select another.

 

In this manner, the Maheral retains its ability of regulating the activity of the Silver Council and safeguarding the purity of the nation but now it who simply is must work together with the citizenry, losing the power to silence the will of the people. Similarly, the Sohaer’s leadership role in the Council is reinforced, gaining the ability, with the people’s grace, to remove those incompetent, defending thus the progress that the nation must pursue.

 

The composition of the heial’thilln I would not change, a government consisting of the Sohaer, the four Okariran (the Okarir’maehr, the Okarir’hiylun, the Okarir’tir and the Okarir’nor) and their respective Tilruiran sufficing for the efficient administration of the state. However, an important obligation of the Sohaer, which, unfortunately, was overlooked by past governments, is that of encouraging cooperation between the Okariran for the purpose of offering the citizenry standards of living and services apt for the Mali’thill. Likewise, the Sohaer must ensure that none of the Okarir infringe upon the rights of another or defy their responsibilities. Again, for the health of the government and of the nation, the Okariran must cooperate in peace, and the Sohaer must make sure of that. I would, personally, not change the attributes and responsibilities of the Okariran and the Tilruiran as laid down in Article II, Sections V-VIII of the 1774 Constitution. Perhaps the only addition I would make would be that of granting the Okarir’maehr and Okarir’hiylun the legal privilege of selecting two Tilruiran each, due to their primary role in society and them each overseeing two institutions. The Council elections as explained in Article II, Section II ought also to remain, with the added order that elections must never, under any circumstance or danger, foreign or domestic, be skipped over. And, let us not forget, all positions of the council must be open to challenge.

 

Now, in regards to the heial’tuva, this hypothetical version of a Silver Republic does grant it more power which is mostly consultative in nature. It, as an institution on its own, would have no ability of overriding the decisions of the Silver Council, nor would it have the function of creating legislation. It would, however, prove decisive each time the Maheral would see fit to convoke it or whenever the Sohaer or Medi’ir would initiate their respective votes of confidence as described above. It is imperious for a democracy that the voice of the populace is heard and, with additional power of the heial’tuva, that would come closer to fruition than in the last Republic. I would, however, make “the rights to public debate, to vote in public election, and to run in and challenge any elected office [...] to bear arms within the walls of the Silver City” independent of the heial’tuva, them being granted to all citizens above the age of majority. It would coincide with their induction into the heial’tuva, yes, but those rights transcend the institution, those rights are one with the individual.

 

This organization of the system and distribution of power would, in the author’s views, serve the students of Larihei much better than any dictatorship, be it of the Maheral or the Sohaer. May, in the future, the Mali’thill not refute so carelessly the infinite possibilities of progress that come with a democratic republican system.

 

maehr’sae hiylun’ehya,

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Somehow, a copy of this work makes its way to the desk of Greta Goodbarrel. She regards both the title and the author written on the cover with great interest, and reads the entire thing dilligently, nodding along in approval at nearly every word and notion presented. "So what if an elf wrote it? This should required reading for any politician anywhere."

 

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Aymon Liawenys reads through the writings of Maenor with a small appreciative smile over some breakfast and tea, residing peacefully in Haenseti Ruska, looking out of the window to the sound of children playing and many books piled in front of the 'thill, he would continue to write his books with a content expression not even stopping to contemplate the goings on in the fallen city of Haelun'or.

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