Thatpyrodude

“A man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.” Comments Farooq

“I am glad the church was swift in their investigation.” Comments Farooq “They could not have done this quicker”

Its been 10 years? Yikes

“He looks an awfully lot like me.” Comments Lucien V from the seven

Ruling on the Request for Judicial Review: Dangerous Drug Ordinance

Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Puller filed a Request for Judicial Review, asking us to examine the legality of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, calling it an inappropriate use of legislative power by the Ministry of Justice. The ordinance declares “illegal substance” to be an ambiguous term that was not defined by the diet, potentially leading to confusion with the law. The Ministry aimed to alleviate this confusion, by declaring that they would interpret “illegal substance” as “hallucination or personality affecting drugs for recreational use”. Mr. Puller states that they have the power to do so. We do not agree.
 

In an unusual step, This court also held its first oral arguments, a transcript of which is Attached. 

Ambiguous laws are created for various reasons. As this Court has previously noted, sometimes wording comes from painstaking negotiations, or perhaps the diet believed it would be best to allow the agency to use its expertise to define the ambiguous term itself. Regardless of what the reasoning is, it is difficult to imagine they left it ambiguous with the idea that it would not be interpreted and thus the law would not be enforced. While some have asked this court to rule that only the courts may define ambiguous terms, that would be an unfair usurpation of the power of the diet, and would not be practical. By leaving the wording of a statute ambiguous, they’ve delegated their legislative power to the agency, permitting it to use it’s best judgement to interpret the meaning of the word or phrase.

Yet, despite that, the judicial branch plays an important role in ensuring this process is done fairly. An agency may only interpret a statute it administers that is truly ambiguous. If a court finds a word or phrase is not ambiguous, then the meaning of the word or phrase is what is what the court has determined it to be. Furthermore, an agency's interpretation must be reasonable. 

Therefore, this court must first determine if the word illegal substance is ambiguous or not. While a brief does cite the Cacti Prohibition Act, this act was passed prior to the Lex Criminalis Reform Act of 1774, which rewrote a large portion of the criminal law in this country, including “on contraband” which contains the much debated section we are discussing today. Because of this, if the diet wanted to incorporate the Cacti Prohibition Act to define illegal substances, it would have been made clear during this reform. Yet, the diet opted to move forward with ambiguous legislation, suggesting the intention of keeping ambiguous legislation. Therefore, considering there is nothing further defining illegal substances, this Court determines that “illegal substance” is ambiguous and may be defined by the agency that administers the statute, in this case the Ministry of Justice.

Then, we must determine if this interpretation is reasonable. Considering the lack of legislative history on the topic, the Diet offers no guide on what “illegal substance” should cover. Considering the wording of Section 204.04 of the Oren Revised Code, which states: “illegal substances, literature, or items” the Diet seemingly intended to leave it open ended and ambiguous, giving broad discretion to the Ministry of Justice. Therefore, it is reasonable to hold that substances that are “hallucination or personality affecting drugs for recreational use” would be covered under the definition. Still, the title of the section is “On Contraband.” While drugs would seemingly fit under contraband, as the diet has previously legislated on types of drugs before, many items would not. Therefore, this interpretation should not be construed to give the Ministry of Justice unlimited authority to declare every possible item contraband. It must still conform to the traditional definition of contraband, as drugs do.

To conclude, a court will defer to an Agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering as long as the word or phrase they are interpreting is ambiguous and their interpretation is reasonable. If a court holds the law is not ambiguous, the court’s ruling controls. This court holds that “illegal Substance” is ambiguous, and the Ministry of Justice’s interpretation is reasonable. Therefore we defer to their interpretation.

Joined by: Justice NAPIER

Ruling on the Request for Judicial Review: Non-Partisan Courts Act

Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Adler, former Chief Justice of this Court, filed a request for judicial review asking this court to determine the legality of Section I, Article I of the Non-Partisan Courts Act. The act lays out a noble goal, to ensure that courts remain non-partisan so that His Imperial Majesty's citizens may have full trust that court’s are not acting with ulterior motives. While Mr. Adler may be a supporter of these goals, he challenges the means in which they were enacted. 

The text of Section I is as follows; “Court justices are hereby to be barred from running for or holding a seat within the House of Commons.” Mr. Adler lays out three arguments, which if one is accepted, should lead to the repeal of this section. This Court agrees with Mr. Adler’s first argument, that elections are entirely under the purview of His Imperial Majesty and his delegates. The Edict of Reform, 1763 grants His Imperial Majesty the power of both calling and dismissing Diets at will, through the form of a national election. That was affirmed by This Court in The Ruling on the Request for Judicial Review: Election Cancellation and Ballot Nullification, and we see no basis to second guess that decision. Furthermore, This Edict forbids the Diet from legislating on the authority of The Crown. 

Here, The Diet has legislated on who may or may not participate in The Diet. Declaring who may and may not participate in The Diet remains a function of The Crown, as it has previously set age and property restrictions on electoral participation. The Diet, by adding a restriction, is directly interfering with the rights of The Crown, which is strictly forbidden by the Edict of Reform, 1763. Therefore, Section I of the Non-Partisan Courts Act is in violation of the Edict of Reform. This Court sees no reason to further evaluate the arguments of Mr. Adler.

But, this court must make a decision on what to declare invalid. This Court could take the simple approach, striking Section I and leaving the rest of the statute intact. Or, this Court could strike the entirety of the act, going beyond what we were asked to do today. This court will take the latter approach. The creation of legislation is an act of compromise, a legislator works with other legislators to determine each and every word in a bill. The phrasing of bills often results from months of careful negotiation and painstaking discussions. To strike part of a bill and leave the rest intact would upset the compromise that went into the creation of this bill. Without Section I, who is to say that the bill would have passed? This Court can not know, and we are not in the business of guessing what occurred during private negotiations. Therefore, statutes lacking explicit evidence otherwise will be assumed to have been passed in their entirety. Without a part of the bill, the entire bill will cease to exist.

Therefore, the Non-Partisan Courts Act is struck down in it’s entirety by this court on the basis of a violation of the Edict of Reform. The House of Commons is unable to legislate on the authority of His Imperial Majesty. Furthermore, this Court will assume an all or nothing approach with statutes unless explicitly stated otherwise within the four corners of the bill.

Joined by: ALL

Request for Judicial Review Granted; Dangerous Drug Ordinance, 1813

 ________________________________________________

The Request for Judicial Review by Mr. C.B. Puller has been granted. The Supreme Court of Oren will thus be accepting Amicus briefs from the public for the next three months. Any citizen, group or organization is permitted to submit an Amicus brief to the Court. After which, this Court shall review the original complaint, all briefs and any other relevant information to address the questions raised by Mr. Puller. Since no injunction has been requested, none will be granted. 

 _______________________________________________

Farooq frowns

Request for Judicial Review Granted; Article I of the Non-Partisan Courts Act

 ________________________________________________

The request for Judicial Review by Mr. Joseph Adler has been granted. The Supreme Court of Oren will thus be accepting Amicus briefs from the public for the next three months. Any citizen, group or organization is permitted to submit an Amicus brief to the Court. After which, this Court shall review the original complaint, all briefs and any other relevant information to address the questions raised by Mr. Adler. 

 _______________________________________________

A History of Legislative Success

Farooq Gray has proven himself as a competent and successful legislator. First serving in the 15th diet, he has worked with both Everardines and Josephites on bills. Most recently that was working with Sir Konstantin Wick on the Legal Procedures Bill. Yet, Mr. Gray has written his own bills, most recently having the Lex Criminalis reform bill pass unanimously in the house, leading to a safer Oren. Furthermore, he championed the Protecting Our Veterans Act, granting the hard working hero’s a safety net after retirement. Few candidates have the experience of Farooq Gray.

Experience and Leadership

Farooq Gray has maintained a perfect record of attendance through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Diet. But Farooq Gray has been far from a backbencher, introducing multiple bills of his own and critiquing bills presented by both parties. He has also served as acting minority leader during absences. Outside of the house, Farooq Gray has a long history as a crown solicitor, most notably serving as prosecutor for Crown v. Harjalainen, successfully booting a corrupt crook from The Empire’s leadership. Since them Farooq Gray has since served as Solicitor-General, ensuring criminals are brought to justice. Finally, Farooq spent two decades on the court, setting down multiple landmark rulings that are established legal precedent. Finally, Farooq Gray is the only candidate endorsed by the Union of former solicitors and judges, along with Former Chief Justice, J. Adler.

Platform for the Imperial Diet

Once elected, Farooq Gray will continue to push forward smart legislation, including the following 3 pieces of legislation:

Judicial Reform - Our current legal system is broken. Scoundrels have taken away people’s right to judicial review, putting citizens at risk of unlawful punishment from the diet. Farooq will spearhead legislation to reform the courts, permitting anyone to bring forth judicial review requests.

An Imperial Loan Program - Establishing an Imperial Loan Program to allow citizens that would otherwise be unable to afford the upfront costs of opening a business to receive loans. 

Reestablishment of the constabulary  - Without a dedicated constabulary, corruption is rampant, crime is at an all time high. Farooq will establish a program to reform the constabulary, and ensure it is enacted.

VOTE FAROOQ GRAY 

For sensible leadership.

RP Name: Farooq Gray 
MC Name: Thatpyrodude 
Voted: Yes :)

SURNAME: Gray

FIRST NAME: Farooq

ADDRESS OF RESIDENCE: Little Ves 8

YEAR OF BIRTH: 1730

Are you registered and eligible to vote in the Providence District? Yes

Do you have any other title, peerage or military service that may conflict with becoming a Member of the House of Commons, as per the Edict of Reform (1763)? No

If yes, do you understand that you will be required to resign or abdicate from this position should you be elected to the House of Commons, and if this does not occur your seat shall be considered to be vacant?: Yes

((MC NAME)): Thatpyrodude

Farooq Gray offers his services as an attorney to the accused. Instructions are left to send a letter to Gray & Sons if interested.

@Pimmerd2005

((discord is Thatpyrodude#2437))

SUPREME COURT OF OREN

Farooq B. Gray,

Petitioner ,

vs.

The House of Commons, 

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Oren Supreme Court

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Farooq B. Gray

Friend of the Court

I

The Circuit Court erred in denying the respondent, Farooq B. Gray, a trial. I humbly ask the court to reverse and remand the circuit court so a trial may convene, and we further ask it is reassigned to a justice of the Circuit Court.

II

A hearing is entirely inappropriate in a case when the only question is a matter of law. When the Legal Procedure Act was written in 1772, all citizens had the right to Judicial Review. The Amendment to the Legal Procedure Act, taking away this right, was written in 1803. Therefore, this was not something the House of Commons considered when drafting this law. In 1772, if an issue was entirely a matter of law it would have been filed as a Request for Judicial Review, and not as a lawsuit.

This is supported by the co-sponsor of the bill, myself. The concern behind the addition of the pre-trial hearings was frivolous lawsuits with factual details clearly pointing against the plaintiff, wasting both the court and the defendant’s time. Cases that do not involve factual details would not be subject to this concern. Because the judiciary of this country is so young, there are so many unresolved legal issues that could be presented before the court. The only instances where the Supreme Court has denied Judicial Review have been due to procedural defects, and not an insufficient question. 

Therefore, in this new system where Judicial Review is only available to a select few members of the government, the only solution is to have a matter of law ignore the hearing requirements. The House of Commons did not consider these types of cases when creating the law, and Supreme Court precedent suggests they are always considered.

III

Furthermore, a Supreme Court Justice sitting on a circuit court hearing is not in accordance with the Rights of Man. The Rights of Man include the Right to Trial, which states: 

THE RIGHT TO TRIAL, so no man will ever be wrongly accused when not charged by a trial of their peers.

The Right to Trial in principle protects those in the legal system for an unjust result, and should not be restricted to a plain meaning. That is how I interpreted the Right to Trial as Chief Justice of this court, and that is how the court should interpret it today. 

It is difficult to imagine that a  judge that hears a case overturning his own decision on appeal. That would be the judge admitting a mistake, and while it is a noble idea, most men are unlikely to write to the world of the mistakes. But that is what a petitioner asks of a judge when he appeals that judge’s own decision. This case was heard by the Chief Justice, it would go against the very spirit of the right to trial to permit him to also hear the appeal in this case. 

Even if he were to recuse himself, it would be impossible for I to have a just outcome. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is viewed by many as the ultimate resource on legal matters in this country, furthermore he is loved and admired by his colleagues. Why would they overturn a decision by this wise legal mind? It seems unlikely that they would.

This goes against everything the Right to Trial stands for. If the court wishes for us to view their decisions as just, how could they have the ability to influence their own appeals?

IV

Finally, the ruling by Chief Justice Komnenos is incorrect. The Legal Procedure Act states the following on hearings:

  If the Justice deems the case to hold merit and worthy of the Court’s time, they shall allow the matter to proceed to trial.

This legal question is clearly worthy of the court’s time. I direct the court to the original filling, which is attached. But, I also pull this excerpt from the pre-trial hearing, which has been edited to increase the ease of reading:

Farooq Gray: [The Amendment to the Legal Procedure Act states]: “Only the Supreme Court may accept and enact Judicial Reviews."

Farooq Gray: “If only the Supreme Court may accept and enact Judicial Review, pray tell how a citizen is permitted to use judicial review in the circuit courts.”

William Theodore: “Your Honour -- if the Plaintiff were to read a little more down to the sixth section. Any Imperial subject is required to utilize the circuit court as the first instance of review, whereas appeal can be invoked post-case; In this bill, there is a clear difference between judicial review and review -- these citizens still have the right to their review within the Court, whereafter they might elect to raise such to a judicial review within the Supreme Court -- point stands, citizens should not be able to reach the Supreme Court before being heard within the circuit.“

Mr. Theodore’s argument is far from clear as he states. It is quite ambiguous. To argue that “Review” and “Judicial Review” are two entirely different things is an inherently difficult argument to make. I will not delve into the merits of this argument, I shall save that for the circuit court. But considering a major factor of Mr. Theodore’s case hinges on Review and Judicial Review being two separate things, this is clearly worthy of the court’s time.

Furthermore, this argument by Mr. Theodore ignores the crux of the issue, that the Right to Judicial Review before the Supreme Court is an essential function of the Right to Trial.

V

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully request that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgement of the circuit court and grant myself relief.

Respectfully submitted,

Farooq B. Gray

[Thatpyrodude#2437]

PETITIONS FOR SUMMONS

Farooq Gray v. The House of Commons

The Plaintiff Farooq Gray

Represented pro se 

DESIRES TO SUMMON THE FOLLOWING PARTY TO COURT;

The President of the House of Commons,

on behalf of The House of Commons,

The plaintiff, a citizen per Section 301.011(A) of the Oren Revised Code, submits to the court that the defendant, The House of Commons, unlawfully restricted the plaintiff’s right to trial when creating the Amendment to the Legal Procedure Act, 1803.

Prior to the amendment, Judicial Review was a long held right of citizens first established by Chief Justice d’Arkent over 50 years ago. In creating this mechanism, he permitted citizens to bring their legal concerns directly to the Supreme Court before any harm was suffered. Since then, the Supreme Court has used Judicial review to strike down laws before they could be unlawfully used to trample on the rights of citizens. This has created a de facto right to judicial review, which the Supreme Court affirmed in 1772.

Yet in 1803, the House of Commons passed the Amendment to the Legal Procedure Act, which amended this process. Instead of any citizen being permitted, only a select few government officials would be allowed to seek judicial review. This is a unlawful bill. Considering the right to judicial review has become incorporated in the right to trial, this law violates the rights of man and must be overturned. 

Furthermore, this goes against the very public policy goals of the court. This bill creates another lock on the court house, making it more difficult for citizens to challenge unlawful bills. Instead of being challenged before the bill has harmed anyone, it could only be challenged when a citizen’s rights had been infringed. Furthermore, considering Judicial Review was most often used to challenge government bills that violated the rights of citizens, it is doubtful that the limited government officials permitted to seek Judicial Review would be inclined to make that request. This case itself would have been brought before the Supreme Court through Judicial Review if not for this amendment.

Consequently, the Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of declaring the Amendment of the Legal Procedure Act, 1803 unlawful and void.

ON THE DESIRED DATE OF:

Pending discussions with the Defendant.

YOURS HUMBLY,

Farooq Gray

[Thatpyrodude#2437]

Chief Justice GRAY delivers the opinion of the court

In light of the responsive pleading from the Ministry of Justice and the request from the petitioner, this court dismisses this issue with prejudice.

Joined by: ALL

Request for Judicial Review Granted; Election Precedence 

 ________________________________________________

The Request for Judicial Review requested by Mr. Edward Selm has been granted. The Supreme Court of Oren will thus be accepting Amicus briefs from the public for the next three months. Any citizen, group or organization is permitted to submit an Amicus brief to the Court. After which, this Court shall review the original complaint, all briefs and any other relevant information to address the questions raised by Mr. Selm. Furthermore, no injunction shall be granted, and the duly elected government may begin their term pending the outcome of this litigation.

 ________________________________________________

Request for Judicial Review Granted; Election Cancellation and Ballot Nullification

  ________________________________________________

The request for judicial review by Mr. Samuel Savoyard has been granted. Furthermore, the Court is issuing a 24 hour injunction preventing the destruction of any and all votes and preventing voting from being resumed. The Supreme Court of Oren will thus be accepting Amicus briefs from the public for the next twelve saints hours. Any citizen, group or organization is permitted to submit an Amicus brief to the Court. After which, this Court shall review the original complaint, all briefs and any other relevant information to address the questions raised by Mr. Savoyard.

 ________________________________________________

Ruling on the Appeal in Crown v. Napier

Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellee, Edward Napier, is a well known member of Orenian Society who once served on the Council of State in the Basrid Administration. Since his resignation, he has engaged in certain immoral activities, leading to a reduction in his standing within society. While having a meeting with the Home Secretary, Mr. O’Rourke, he and his orc lover violently attacked Mr. O’Rourke, putting him in a fragile state. The orc was slain and Mr. Napier was arrested and immediately rushed to trial. Mr. Napier was charged by the Crown with Attempted Murder and  Assault, oddly enough failing to charge him with battery. Mr. Napier did not dispute these not the facts and thus they are not in doubt. Instead he claimed he was insane and thus should not be subject to the charges. The jury evidently did not find this defense sufficient and returned a guilty verdict, where he was sentenced to death. This sentence was suspended pending this appeal.

Mr. Napier again did not dispute the facts in his appeal, instead claiming two procedural errors that should render the verdict invalid. The two procedural issues contended are violations of the Legal Procedure Act. Here, Mr. Napier claims the act requires a subpoena and it requires one saints day between the charge and the trial. Oddly enough, the Crown has offered no reply, thus invalidating the need for oral arguments. This Court agrees with Mr. Napier.

The Legal Procedure Act states the following on invoking a criminal trial:

  a. The Imperial Government or a Provincial Government may summon an individual before the Court on criminal charges by submitting a Subpoena;

This is the only means listed in the bill, suggesting that the Diet intended this to be the one and only method for the Crown to invoke a criminal trial. No subpoena was submitted by the crown in this case, meaning the Legal Procedure Act was violated. Considering the lack of defense by the Crown and the already established violation, this Court sees no reason to examine the second issue raised by Mr. Napier. 

Furthermore, while Mr. Napier did not contend the issue, the court ought to address the applicability of the newly passed Double Jeopardy Act. An odd name for the act, which states: 

210.11A - Where an individual has been tried for a crime in a previous court of law, that individual cannot be tried again for the same crime. 

Mr. Napier has already been tried for the crimes of assault and attempted murder. If this Court were to remand or if we were to simply grant the appeal and allow the Crown to refile charges, it would require a second trial to meet its natural conclusion. That would seemingly not be in compliance with this act, thus while granting Mr. Napier’s appeal and overturning his conviction, this Court also finds that the Crown is unable to charge Mr. Napier with attempted murder nor battery related to the attack on Mr. O’Rourke. 

This is not a logical conclusion, but it is the conclusion forced on this Court by the Diet. The Diet has created a statute which would allow criminals who successfully appeal a conviction on a procedural issue avoid any criminal consequence. This is foolhardy and not in accordance with what most Orenian Citizens would view justice to be. But as long as this statute is in effect with its current text, this is how this Court will interpret it. Despite the injustice created by this statute, this Court’s duty is to interpret the law, not legislate from the bench. 

Mr. Napier’s appeal is granted, and he is unable to face further charges for assault or attempted-murder in relation to the attack on Mr. O’Rourke

Joined by: All

Ruling on the Request for Injunctive Relief – E. Napier

Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is the opinion of the court that Mr. Napier’s request for Injunctive Relief is to be granted. His trial is to be concluded, but if sentenced to death he will be held in custody and allowed a time of a year to file an appeal for the Supreme Court. Mr. Napier is not to be executed prior to this time.

Joined by: All

Farooq frowns after reading over the paper

Ruling on the Request for Judicial Review: Second Lemonade Legal Reform

Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Barclay filed suit after the House of Commons passed The Second Lemonade Legal Reform Bill, which notably regulates the creation and authorization of militias. Oddly, Mr. Barclay voted aye before filling his suit, but this court shall not consider that to be a relevant fact. Instead. We consider Mr. Barclay’s request for judicial review on the basis of the House of Commons not having the jurisdiction to legislate on matters related to the military.

Mr. Barclay states in his filling that the Imperial Diet can not pass legislation regarding the military. The Edict of Reform clearly outlines the limitations on the House of Commons, one being that they are not permitted to legislate on the military. The question for this Court is if The Second Lemonade Legal Reform Bill is a statute that affects the military, or if it is a separate matter entirely. This court agrees with the arguments outlined by Mr. Barclay.

Mr. Barclay argues the Edict of Reform prevents the statute passed in the House of Commons, which states:

The Imperial Diet’s functions and legislation, as a whole, are prohibited from interaction with the following matters of

state, which remain the exclusive purview of the Crown.

• The military and appointment of generals and other commanders. 

• The Crown, the succession, its authority, and the Imperial household.

• Diplomacy and foreign affairs, exempting when permitted by the Crown in special circumstances.

The language is clear that any statute which may interfere with the structure, maintenance or operation of the military is to be prevented by this Court. In this Bill, the House of Commons aims to allow the creation of a militia, directly altering the structure of the military by creating additional armed forces that do not operate under the traditional structure. Even with the requirement of approval by the Minister of War, the bill violates the clear limitation placed on the House of Common by His Imperial Majesty.

Mr. Rakoczy submitted an Amicus Brief outlining the argument by the House of Commons. While they outline two different arguments, they fail to provide evidence for their conclusions and thus do not provide this Court with enough evidence that sufficiently convinces us to believe their conclusions to be correct.

The first argument outlined by Mr. Rakoczy is that this matter falls under a matter of state. It is impossible for this court to come to that conclusion with the evidence provided. While Mr. Rakoczy argues that the management of estates is not a matter that is not covered by the limitations outlined by the Edict of Reform, we fail to see how that is relevant. Mr. Rakoczy does not sufficiently explain how militias are equivalent to the management of estates. It is curious why the House of Commons would require the Minister of War’s authorization on a matter simply related to the management of estates. Instead this Court believes this requirement to be an acknowledgement of the military significance of this statute.

The second argument brought forth by Mr. Rakoczy is that “the military” in The Edict of Reform has a constructed meaning, equivalent to “The Imperial State Military.” He provides no basis or reasoning for this belief, which forces this Court to reject it. Furthermore, this Court holds that interpreting the Edict of Reform in the way asked by Mr. Rakoczy would render the line “and appointment of general and other commanders” redundant. Therefore, this court rejects this position.

To conclude, The Second Lemonade Legal Reform is struck down by this Court on the basis of a violation of the Edict of Reform. The House of Commons is unable to legislate on matters which may interfere with the structure, maintenance or operation of the military. 

Joined by: Chief Justice ADLER, 

Justice SARKOZY

Request for Judicial Review Granted; Second Lemonade Legal Reforms Bill (1776)

  ________________________________________________

The Request for Judicial Review requested by Mr. Conrad Barclay has been granted. The Supreme Court of Oren will thus be accepting Amicus briefs from the public for the next three months. Any citizen, group or organization is permitted to submit an Amicus brief to the Court. After which, this Court shall review the original complaint, all briefs and any other relevant information to address the questions raised by Mr. Barclay.

 ________________________________________________

Ruling on the Request for Judicial Review: Admissibility of testimonies of Non-Intelligent Persons 

Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

A request for Judicial Review has long been an essential part of the Orenian legal system. It was most recently reaffirmed by both The Diet and His Imperial Majesty with the Legal Procedure Act, 1772. The following guidelines were outlined by The Imperial Diet in relation to Invoking Judicial Review:

  a. Any Imperial subject or government may submit a Request for Judicial Review to call upon the Supreme Court to review the legality of any Edict, Act, or Order issued throughout the Empire;

Upon review of the stature, section a states a Judicial Review can be used to “call upon the Supreme Court to review the legality of any Edict, Act, or Order issued throughout the Empire.” The Request for Judicial Review issued by Mr. Alimar asks us to review the legality of witness testimony in the case of Crown v. Alimar (1780). In order to do this, we must first review if Witness Testimony falls under the definition of “Edict, Act or Order” as set out by the Imperial Diet. After a thorough review of the materials at hand, this court is unable to find that Witness Testimony falls under this definition. 

Despite the extensive list of definitions attached to the Legal Procedure Act, 1772 and to the Oren Revised Code, there is no clear definition of an Edict, Act, or Order. Looking to common law also fails us, as there has been no adjudication on this matter. Thus it is up to this court to determine the definition of Edict, Act or Order. Yet this court has not been established to become a legislator, merely a body to clarify existing statues and reviewing appeals. Thus, this court must look at the intention of the law, seeing the text is unclear. Reviewing the transcript of The House of Commons provides no insight, seeing as there was only a brief discussion on the entirety of the bill, and no discussion on Judicial Review itself. 

Thus, we must take an unfortunate route of using “common sense” to determine whether the legislature would have envisioned Witness Testimony to fall under the definition of Edict, Act, or Order. In order to make this determination, we must imagine that there is a fictitious legislator able to answer questions about the Legal Procedure Act, 1772. In doing so we would imagine what the common sense answer this reasonable legislator would give, in determining if Witness Testimony falls under the definition of Edict, Act or Order. The answer to this question is no, an Edict, Act, or Order generally applies to actions of our legislative branch (The Imperial Diet), or our executive branch (The Government), and of course, in this sense is not applicable to His Imperial Majesty. The Diet only reaffirms this belief in the Legal Procedure Act, 1772 by outlining a separate appeals process for judicial decisions. Considering this, it is outside the scope of this court to review the legality of witness testimony or to review judicial decisions in a Request for Judicial Review.

Thus, the Request for Judicial Review filed by Mr. Alimar is denied without prejudice. 

Joined by: Chief Justice ADLER, 

Justice SARKOZY