On the ruling of Crown v. Karoly

[frill 2277]

 

 

On the ruling of Crown v. Karoly

 

Reflections on post-Pertinaxi court judgements in the ”new imperial” system.

 

6^th of Godfrey’s Triumph, 1761.

 

 

It was said that during the era of the late Pertinaxi high-magistrates that their legal rulings - often, admittedly, dramatic beheadings for contrived fictions of law - would not face any publishing beyond the verbal immediacy of the court-room, so they would be a rarefied commodity and difficult to gain knowledge of, thus entrapping unfortunate peasantry into inadvertent violation.

 

A legal system that determines legal judgements without expounding any basis in law of these judgements raises a similar tyranny. It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver nor emotional response of the judge to whatever sordid affairs are being discussed in his court. Although there is a brief moment for moralising, this is a moment wholly possessed by the lawgiver-senator in the promulgation of the law, it is the necessary duty and binding compact of the judge-and-law to interpret the law with an emotionless textualism. It was the intent of the framers of the edicts of Alexander II to form a government of laws, not a government of men and personalities. It is by virtue of the mutual agreement that men may intend what they will, but it is only the law that these men enact that has any binding authority. To devote the majority of a legal judgement to espousing an emotional diatribe with regards to the reception of some verdict instead of expounding the basis in law of this judgement is a legal misstep and an anachronism at the highest level of imperial legislature.

 

The precedence, now, for the highest court in the land to fill the majority of its judgement with a diary entry that waxes lyrical about the sacrosanct burden of the court as “something to be disagreed with” and interdepartmental government politics unrelated to the case at hand is disappointing for legislators within the senate and the parties involved alike. It is a surety that an analysis of the legal argument and basis-in-law of the eloquent John Everard Pruvia’s arguments would have been both good legal study and a tool for future barristers. I can only see the removal of such as either a person attack on Pruvia or a political one on the state that referred to the prosaic judge as one of “ineptitude and failure”.

 

I do hope Pruvia, Adler, et al. are issued an apology and a more useful judgement of law than the glib fact that the court “elected to acquit” is issued.