Request for Judicial Review Granted; Dangerous Drug Ordinance, 1813

[Thatpyrodude 2008]

Request for Judicial Review Granted; Dangerous Drug Ordinance, 1813

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The Request for Judicial Review by Mr. C.B. Puller has been granted. The Supreme Court of Oren will thus be accepting Amicus briefs from the public for the next three months. Any citizen, group or organization is permitted to submit an Amicus brief to the Court. After which, this Court shall review the original complaint, all briefs and any other relevant information to address the questions raised by Mr. Puller. Since no injunction has been requested, none will be granted. 

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JUDICIAL REVIEW RESPONSE: DANGEROUS DRUGS ORDINANCE OF 1813 

11th of Godfrey’s Triumph, 1815

THE CROWN,

Represented by ELASAR ILLYID of THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,

 

DESIRES TO RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING  JUDICIAL REVIEW;

DANGEROUS DRUGS ORDINANCE OF 1813

1. Facts of the case and of relevant cases

On the 5th of Godfrey’s Triumph, 1813, the Solicitor-General issued an ordinance dictating that dangerous, personality-altering drugs were to be considered contraband in accordance with 204.04 of the Orenian Revised Code. The ordinance was signed and approved by both His Excellency, the Solicitor-General, and His Imperial Excellency, the Archchancellor. The ordinance was met with some opposition, arguing that the edict was beyond the purview of executive actions and required legislation in the Diet. The Ministry of Justice spent time enforcing the Solicitor-General’s interpretation of the law, though in that time no cases were brought to trial, and not even a fine was issued. The interpretation itself primarily served a State interest in targeting organized crime and seedy vendors of unsavory goods.

 

Mr. Puller and Mr. Turgon filed a request for the Court to review the Solicitor-General’s right to interpret law as part of his duties. The Court granted the request and began accepting Amicus briefs.

 

In the case of THE CROWN v. VEIKKO HARJALAINEN, Mr. Harjalainen had defrauded, embezzled, and stolen 50,000 Marks from the State while in service of the Imperial Treasury. Harjalainen was charged with Fraud, Grand Theft, and Treason. The Circuit Court ruled that evidence proved Harjalainen had in fact committed this theft and stolen this incredibly serious amount worth 2,500 Marks today, and ruled guilty on the charges of theft of fraud. However, the Circuit Court also ruled that such significant theft from the State was not guilty on the charge of treason because the Circuit Justice was uncomfortable concluding such as it strayed from the specific text of treason, ORC 204.01. No appeal was filed due to practicality; Harjalainen had been banished from the Empire and the Ministry of Justice had accomplished its goal in the case.

 

2. Issues Presented

1. Is interpretation of the law part of the Solicitor-General’s authority? Yes.

2. Was the dangerous drug ordinance a circumvention of legislature and judicial oversight? No.

3. Was the Archchancellor’s signature a legitimization of the ordinance? No, the Archchancellor’s signature was not necessarily required.

 

3. Arguments

1. Is interpretation of the law part of the Solicitor-General’s authority? 

 

Yes, interpretation of the law is an inherent requirement of enforcing and upholding law. As soon as an agent of the State is given the authority to make arrests, they are also given the duty to interpret law and legal situations in order to do so. At its most minor, a Private of the Imperial State Army discovering a simple tavern fight must make a determination or interpretation of the infractions, compared with the law itself and seek out the execution of the law as necessary. Violation of the law may occur in such a situation, but in such a Private’s interpretation, it may not warrant charges or punishment.  

 

More relevant to the case at hand is the interpretation of law when prosecuting a case. The charge of treason in Harjalainen was itself an interpretation by the prosecution that significant theft and embezzlement from the state constituted treason. While the judge in that instance did not find the defendant guilty of treason, and we will later argue for the Court to reverse the precedent set by it, precedent was set that prosecuting law inherently requires interpretation of the law in establishing guilt of a given law. In that case, all parties involved were certainly aware that the crime was not in the specific text of treason, and yet the judge did not throw out the treason charge at the onset of trial, and certainly did not find the addition of the charge to have been an illegal action of the Ministry of Justice because it was not--it was a necessary and inherent function of prosecuting law. It is up to judges, appointed by the Crown and approved by the Commons, to make a final determination on the accuracy of the prosecution’s argument for their interpretation.

 

We urge the Court to consider that interpreting law is an inherent task carried out when undertaking a proper and successful prosecution of crime. As the chief legal officer of the Empire, the Solicitor-General is the chief authority on these sorts of interpretations. Issuing the relevant ordinance was a fair and necessary notice to the Empire of how contraband, an ambiguous law, will be interpreted, with explicit approval of that interpretation from the Archchancellor. We motion the Court to instead consider further review of how ambiguous law can be prosecuted, rather than rule that the Ministry of Justice cannot prosecute beyond the specific text of the law as the Petitioners argue. We will expand on the argument that prosecution beyond the exact text of the law is a vital state interest in section IV.

 

2. Was the dangerous drug ordinance a circumvention of legislature and judicial oversight? 

 

No, we urge the Court to consider that before finding a hypothetical defendant guilty of these contraband charges, such a charge must be firmly established in a court of law. The Commons had approved law creating a charge of contraband and had only established rudimentary definitions of contraband, without suggesting extent or limitations to the charge itself. By not creating a new criminal charge, the ordinance had hardly circumvented the legislature. The courts maintained an integral part of the system, directly and indirectly overseeing any potential contraband charges. The courts still maintain an integral part of the system; as we argue before the Court now, there is direct judicial oversight of the Solicitor-General’s interpretation of contraband. The argument required on this ordinance is whether the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General’s interpretation, not whether the Solicitor-General’s interpretation is legal; it most certainly is.

 

3. Was the Archchancellor’s signature a legitimization of the ordinance?

 

No, the Archchancellor’s signature was not necessarily required. The Archchancellor’s signature is not necessary on any other given prosecution of law. In this instance, it only offered a valuable approval notable to citizenry concerned about the ordinance, and wary of the Solicitor-General’s announced intention to prosecute an ambiguous portion of law that possessed a potential to affect a large portion of Orenians.

 

4. Argument to reverse THE CROWN v. VEIKKO HARJALAINEN

The Circuit Court very simply did not wish to make a decision potentially deemed “judicial activism” meant primarily for the Supreme Court when it found Mr. Harjalainen not guilty of treason. Furthermore, as already established, the Ministry of Justice did not appeal for the Court to consider this precedent for simple reasons of practicality. Instead, we now urge the Court to consider the circuit justice’s decision in that case and reverse it. It is imperative to legitimate state interests in prosecuting crime that crime may be prosecuted outside of the specific text of the law. The text of CH204.01, which Harjalainen had been charged with, includes “intent to compromise the integrity of the Crown and its constituent institutions by waging insurrection and seeking the destruction of the Imperial State by impugning the character and person of the Crown through subversive means such as collusion with enemy entities and actors against the State, this shall be the crime of treason.” The Ministry of Justice does not disagree that Harjalainen’s crime did not match the specific text listed here. However, the crimes absolutely compromised the integrity of the Crown and its treasury through subversive means, and only lists collusion with enemies of the state as one such example. It is clear that Mr. Harjalainen’s crime not only fit a significant portion of the specific text, but far more so the spirit and intent of this specific text.

 

As the Court did well to note in Adler v. Non-Partisan Courts Act, “The creation of legislation is an act of compromise, a legislator works with other legislators to determine each and every word in a bill. The phrasing of bills often results from months of careful negotiation and painstaking discussions.” It is not infrequent that consideration of prosecution can indeed be forgotten as part of these negotiations and compromise, and further are written with a certain intent whilst the need for negotiation, timeliness, and generating consensus leaves out specific circumstances, regardless of how important they may be. This is how Mr. Harjlainen was able to avoid guilt of treason when he stole a grand sum from the state treasury. We urge the Court to overturn this textual approach to criminal law set in Harjalainen, and note, firstly, that crime may be committed outside of the specific text of law. Secondly, we urge the Court to consider a rule for how this interpretation and prosecution of crimes outside of specific text is to be conducted for the sake of clarifying the Petitioners' concerns.

 

5. Conclusion

We urge the Court to consider the following arguments raised by this brief:

• That the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of 1813 was not an illegal circumvention, but a reasonable interpretation of law within the duty to uphold the law.

• That interpreting the law is an inherent duty in prosecuting the law, and that the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of 1813 was a reasonable announcement of this interpretation and intent to enforce accordingly.

• That discussion of the Archchancellor’s role in this ordinance is irrelevant for the purpose of determining legality.

• That crimes may occur outside of the specific text of the law charted in a given text, and to overturn the precedent set by The Crown v. Harjlainen accordingly. 

• That further hearing or review be conducted to determine how prosecution outside of the specific text of law ought to be conducted.

YOURS HUMBLY,

Inspector-General Elasar Ilyid on behalf of THE CROWN,

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROVIDENCE

[[wealthypiano#5651]]

[DelaneyG 1279]

AMICUS BRIEF FOR THE COURT’S REVIEW

OF THE

DANGEROUS DRUG ORDINANCE

SUBMITTED BY Geoff Turgon

 

ISSUE PRESENTED

Does the Solicitor-General have authority to interpret and change existing law? No.

Does the Solicitor-General have authority to legislate law? No.

 

ARGUMENTS 

1. Does the Solicitor-General have authority to interpret and change existing law?

The Solicitor-General’s duties and authorities are outlined within Imperial Law, 601.04. In this section we see policing and enforcing law, offering services of lawyers and clerks in prosecuting and defense. We see his roles clearly laid out, and nowhere is it his business to interpret the law, and change it thusly. 

A lawyer’s role is to interpret the law and argue his interpretation, but in the end he does not change it. He simply argues for his client, and it is up to the judiciary to decide which argument holds the most weight. The Solicitor-General’s office is permitted to interpret law the way a lawyer can: Their clerks may act as both prosecutor and defense, and as such must interpret the law to argue for their clients, but that is where that authority stops. 

 

A Constable’s role is to enforce the law as it is written and interpreted by the legislative and judiciary branches, respectively. He cannot interpret the law and decide whether or not an act is criminal- it simply is or is not. Were he to detain an individual and confiscate their possession because he interpreted law in a way that would declare that individual as a criminal, he would be stripping them of their given rights (O.R.C: ADDENDUM, Excerpt Upon the Rights of Man). The Solicitor-General’s office is charged with staffing a Constabulary and policing Oren, but it does not allow him to create law and then enforce it.

 

The interpretation of the law is saved for the Courts and the Crown’s judges. It is their sworn duty to listen to arguments presented before them, analyze the dispute, and make the decision. 

To take away from the Courts’ authority to interpret the law and put it instead in the hands of officials appointed by the government itself and not by the people’s representatives is both a dangerous precedent and a castration of the judiciary.

2. Does the Solicitor-General have authority to legislate law?

The Solicitor-General is permitted to draft law for the consideration of the Crown. At no point can he act as a one man legislative body and pass law. To do so would be tyrannical, and would undermine the very foundations of what we have created. As the Court said in Adler v Non Partisan Courts Act  “The creation of legislation is an act of compromise, a legislator works with other legislators to determine each and every word in a bill. The phrasing of bills often results from months of careful negotiation and painstaking discussions.” The Court was very wise to say such. To create law, legislators are required to work together. Negotiate, discuss, and then vote on what they have drafted. One man cannot negotiate, discuss, and vote alone. When one man does those alone, it is the act of a tyrant.

Conclusion

The Ministry of Justice serves as a tool for our government and must be reminded of its place - to enforce and argue laws in court, not to create them. What is the purpose of the legislative and judiciary branches if this office is permitted to legislate, interpret, and enforce with no separation of power? If the Solicitor-General wishes to see change done, he must argue it like a lawyer for the Crown’s consideration, not circumvent those who grant him his authority.

The precedent that would be set, should this Edict be upheld, would render the judiciary useless and easily circumvented by whomever happens to hold the keys to the Solicitor-General’s office. Perhaps Sir Galbraith truly thought he was doing good and for that one cannot hold ill will, but should his Office hold such power down the road we may regret it deeply.

 

Yours Humbly,

Geoff Turgon

[CharmingCavalier 2189]

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE HOLY ORENIAN EMPIRE

12th of Godfrey's Triumph, 1815

 

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IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DANGEROUS DRUG ORDINANCE OF 1813

 

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A BRIEF ON BEHALF OF A PRIVATE CITIZEN AND SOLICITOR,

MR. HENRY PENTON,

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER.

 

 

DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

 

By allowing the Solicitor-General to interpret the same laws he is tasked to enforce sets a dangerous precedent. Coupled with the fact that the Solicitor-General is allowed to "draft laws, both civil and criminal, for consideration by the Crown" (604.04B), it creates a terrible disorder whereby one individual is given the power to interpret the law, pass legislation, and enforce said laws. Striking down 604.04B would be preferable, but it is also acceptable to strike down the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance as precedent that the Solicitor-General cannot interpret the law to extremes, as that power is reserved to the judiciary.

 

In short, this court should find that our legislature makes laws, our judiciary interprets them, and our bureaucracy enforces them. This is a delicate separation of power and when an official, such as the Solicitor-General, grows beyond those bounds, it is the right of the judiciary to restate the divisions persistently.

 

FACTS NOT PRESENTED BY THE BRIEF FROM THE CROWN

 

The brief from the Crown excludes key aspects of important information and presents troubling insight into the ordinance. First, it fails to mention that the ordinance was enacted with no time for public comment and went into immediate effect, in which time it was enforced relentlessly among a citizenry which was unreasonably and unfairly surprised. If this law had progressed through the legislature, it would have been visible to the public, but instead, it was crafted behind closed doors and improperly sprung upon the populace.

 

Second, the Crown's brief states, "the argument required on this ordinance is whether the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General's interpretation, not whether the Solicitor-General's interpretation is legal." This is wholly incorrect. This court should, and does, maintain the right to interpret both the legality and interpretation of the Solicitor-General's ordinance.

 

Third, the Crown's brief states, "The Ministry of Justice spent time enforcing the Solicitor-General's interpretation of the law, though in that time no cases were brought to trial, and not even a fine was issued" it fails to mention the unwarranted searches performed by the Ministry of Justice's officials.

 

As a state solicitor in the Ministry of Justice at this time, I can attest that the Solicitor-General issued a memo to the Ministry asking officers to search all who 'looked suspicious.' While this was later retracted and revised, this initial order presents a troubling lack of reasonable suspicion and bias on the Solicitor-General's part. It further speaks to the trouble this act has caused by being of bureaucratic design, not legislative procedure.

 

In conclusion, the Crown's brief seems fixated on the fact they have not brought any citizen to trial or fined them for their offenses. They refuse to acknowledge the unreasonable and unfair detainment and surprise of individuals as intrusive, improper, and unnecessary.

 

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF 204.04

 

This brief asks the court to apply statutory construction when considering statute 204.04 from the Orenian Revised Code.

 

The Oren Revised Code, The Infractions Act of 1767, and The Lex Criminalis Reform Act of 1774 are the only times the section "On Contraband" is mentioned in the modern form, as appears in the Orenian Revised Code. In none of these documents does the term "illegal substances'' have a further definition.

 

Therefore, it is the judiciary's job to look at the statute's words and apply their usual or ordinary meaning. However, it is prudent to conduct further investigation and reveal the intent of the legislature. Here the judiciary will find that the intent was not to declare all 'dangerous drugs' as illegal, or they would have defined such substances as was done in the Foreign Tobacco and Cacti Prohibition Act. As a result, the interpretation presented by the Solicitor-General is not statutorily constructed and based solely upon his discretion, not an interpretation of the law.

 

Additionally, this brief agrees with the respondent representing the Crown, Mr. Elasar Illyid, that this court should develop a set of rules by which a bureaucrat can legally interpret the law when prosecution of crimes is outside of the specific text mentioned in the Orenian Revised Codes, to allow for fair interpretation at the discretion of this court.

 

This brief proposes the following rules by which this test should be constructed:

 

1. If a law or regulation is genuinely unclear, a bureaucrat may only interpret within the realm of reasonable ambiguity.

2. This interpretation may not develop new regulations outside the purview of the original law.

3. Interpretations may only be made by high-ranking officials.

4. All interpretations must be submitted to the legislature for review.

5. All interpretations must be announced with time for public comment. They must not enact unreasonable or unfair surprise upon the citizens of Oren.

6. Any interpretation must be statutorily constructed, meaning it looks to the legislature's original intention when passage occurred.

 

An interpretation should be viewed as null if it fails any of the tests as mentioned above.

 

AFOREMENTIONED RULE APPLICATION TO THIS JUDICIAL REVIEW

 

To apply this procedure, in respective order, to this judicial review yields the following:

 

1. (FAILS) Illegal substances have been legislated in the past, as demonstrated by the petitioner, in cases such as The Foreign Trade and Cacti Prohibition Act. The wording “illegal substances'' in the Orenian Revised Code was not ambiguous because it had been defined in the past through legislation, therefore:

2. (FAILS) The introduction of the Dangerous Drug Ordinance was not within the original text's purview, instead opting to create new regulations without consulting either the judiciary or the legislature.

3. (PASSES) A high-ranking official, the Solicitor-General, performed the interpretation.

4. (N/A) This precedent is not, and was not, in place and therefore cannot be tested.

5. (FAILS) This regulation was announced with no time for public comment and had an immediate effect. It inflicted unreasonable and undue surprise on the populace.

6. (FAILS) The interpretation presented by the Solicitor-General is not statutorily constructed and based solely upon his discretion, not an interpretation of the law in its original context. The Solicitor-General presented no proof or citation to show the historical context of said interpretation.

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

• By allowing the Solicitor-General to draft and interpret laws, this court would set a dangerous precedent whereby it decreases the judiciary's power and the legislature's in favor of a circumvention of our divided form of government.

  • This court should find that our legislature makes laws, our judiciary interprets them, and our bureaucracy enforces them.

• The right to act as the final arbiter of legal interpretations of statutes and regulations should rest solely with the judiciary. This serves to protect the citizens and their legislature from an oppressive bureaucracy.

  • A dangerous precedent could be determined within this review as ministries will have unfettered rights to interpret regulations and laws, seizing both the judiciary's and the legislature's power if a rule set is not adequately developed.

  • It is good practice that a bureaucrat should not be able to both interpret and enforce the law. A clear distinction must be drawn: Our legislature makes laws, our judiciary interprets them, and our bureaucracy enforces them.

• New evidence has been presented to this court in this brief that the Solicitor-General had ordered members of the Ministry of Justice to partake in unreasonable searches due to citizens "appearing suspicious." While later retracted and revised, this initial order shows the necessity of judicial review, not unrestricted or undefined bureaucratic interpretation.

• This brief presented a new set of rules by which a bureaucrat can legally interpret the law when the prosecution of crimes is outside the specific text. This brief urges the judiciary to adopt or adapt these stated rules to avoid further review on matters such as this and enshrine a just precedent for future judicial reviews.

• This brief used the aforementioned rule set to test the Dangerous Drug Ordinance. It failed, and as a result, if the court adopts or adapts this set of rules, in full or in part, it must be seen as entirely unlawful, null, and void.