JUSTICE and LAW: a Question of Predication?

[Bogatyr 335]

Spoiler

 

a.Mtr. Adolpha Yohānāh, FSPST, to Father Wenceslas Bainbridge, FSPST, be this open response written (&del.),

Love not the world, nor the things therein, but if you have need to love anything, then love Our Heavenly Father alone. For, if any man among you should love the world, then the love of the Father is not with him. And when you pass away and the lust therein; the will of the HaShem abides for-ever (even so that HaShem abides for-ever).

Ineffable Creator,

Who, from the treasures of Your Wisdom have established many hierarchies of angels, have arrayed them in marvellous order above the fiery Heavens, and have marshalled the regions of the world with many treasures of taste and unsubtle intellect,

You are proclaimed the true font of light and wisdom, and the primal origin raised high beyond all things. You make eloquent the tongues of neonates and infants and thereafter. Refine my lips and pour forth upon my lips the keenness of speech, which proceedeth from the goodness of Your blessing.

Grant, O merciful Lord, that I may ardently enquire, prudently examine, truthfully acknowledge, and articulately accomplish what is pleasing to You for the praise and glory of Your name. Amen.

(Adolpha Yohānāh, daughter)

b.Since I am charged with the part of philolexian, I will endeavour to corroborate, enquire, and trial the positions of the addendum to the Lex Theodicea alone as opposed to its parent. Of which agreement, I claim no sympathy nor concern nor passion for lawyering and earthly legal contracts;

 

JUSTICE AND LAW: A QUESTION OF PREDICATION?

i.In any discussion of polity, we must probe the principal question of how Man can conduct himself rightly, justly, orderly in the state of nature viz. how he can order his tribe toward egality and virtue. We know that these qualities constitute the end of the state of nature, inasmuch as it is affirmed that “[God’s] law is the virtuous law, and all the blessings of the Virtue shall serve the righteous kings and servants alike,” (Virtue 6:9). CONFER, it is evident that the distribution of justice—which is the law—presupposes as its formal cause both the equality of the persons before the law and the moral disposition of virtue in those who administer and receive it.¹ In light thereof, we must accurately define justice and how we know that things are just.

 

ii.The question of justice turns on the logical problem of predication. The disagreement between predicates is between those that are predicated in quid and those that are predicated in quale—the difference, in short, being between those that tell us what the object is, what pertains to its nature (e.g., the existence of justice), and those that attribute incidental properties, relations, etc. (e.g., the property of being just). When we say of someone or something that they are good or just––let us say the Canonist––it is much like saying, “the Canonist is a carpenter.” The predicate of being a carpenter seems to inform us of what kind of thing the Canonist is. He could not be without that predicate and still be a man. However, it seems more that the predicate is an accidental quality. He had to exist in order to acquire this skill and would continue to be who he is if all his knowledge of carpentry suddenly deserted him. Thus, we treat carpentry as a quality rather than a substance, and therefore a predicate in quale. Carpentry is a habit, as a sort of accidental form the subject takes on, not part of his essence.

 

iii.This form can be applied to the idea of justice also. Justice is a habit in the same way that carpentry is. Neither is what the Canonist—or any man—is essentially, as the Doctors may call it, his quidditas, but rather what he is like by his disposition. From this dialectic, we can arrive at the definition that justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant will. The precepts of natural law and justice sometimes are in it only habitually, even though they are sometimes actually considered by reason, thus justice can be called a habit.

 

iv.By outlining justice as such, we can revisit Bainbridge’s responsio a Qs.1&6;

“It must be held that human law, though imperfect in origin, may be truly just insofar as it reflects divine providence and seeks the common good under right reason. The law does not derive its justice from the personal sanctity of the legislator, but from its conformity to the eternal law (lex aeterna) which is God's will itself (cf. Apologetica I.I). Thus, the Emperor and his ministers, even as fallen instruments, may serve as valid conduits of divine order so long as they do not legislate contrary to virtue.

[…]

Though human law is finite, it may participate analogically in divine justice when it is rightly ordered to the good, tempered by mercy, and shaped by reason. The law need not be perfect to reflect the perfect; it need only strive to conform itself to the will of God as revealed in nature, reason, and the Scrolls. In this striving, law becomes not merely functional, but sanctifying, a pedagogue unto righteousness and a mirror, though dim, of heavenly order.”

(sec.i,vi)

Human law may be just, although strictly by its participation in the divine will through rightly ordered habits. And, justice, being a habit underpinning human law, allows this participation. Bainbridge gestures toward this, in brief, as saying “The law does not derive its justice from the personal sanctity of the legislator, but from its conformity to the eternal law (lex aeterna) which is God's will itself [cit.].” (sec.i, res.). This judgement seems to distinguish: a) what the legislator is, essentially, as in quid, i.e. fallen, unsanctified, and b) what he may do or participate in accidentally, as in quale, i.e. acting justly, legislating rightfully. Both of which Bainbridge treats functionally but not formally, which I hope to have grounded ontologically as explained in the above articles. We see this gesture mirrored also as, “even fallen man retains participation in divine order.” (ibid.), to which ends we see the word participation hinting toward a relation between the essential divine justice and the habitual human justice.

 

v.Bainbridge also sets up, in Q.6, the interesting argument that human law may analogically reflect divine justice: “it may participate analogically in divine justice when it is rightly ordered to the good.” (sec.vi, res.). But, this only makes sense if justice is not a purely divine essence, but something which can exist in degrees, save in imitation, which is resolutely false as considering, “For His power is not parted among His many servants, but imitated, and in His multitude of ways, He is above them all.” (Dwarves 5:19). As in Q.1, Bainbridge leaves the mode of this participation, or analogy, unexplained. But, by defining justice as habitual and participatory, we can conclude that the law and lawmakers are not essentially just, but that their justice arises by habitual conformity viz. a quality in quale, not strictly a divine essence.

 

vi.This ontological correction also helps in addressing the objection that, “Moreover, man legislates in time, whereas God judges outside of time. Therefore, no law of man can reflect His eternal judgment.” (sec.vi, ob.ii). A temporal agent, a man, can predicate justice of his acts, without being justice itself.

 

CONCLUSIO: Justice is a habitual quality rather than an essential property, and thus, fallen man can enact justice without being essentially just (the predicate is in quale).

 

^1:In this respect, I agree with the Lex Theodicea’s parent judgement concerning the automatism in punishment and the collapse of discretion, though I prefaced that this response would not touch on the original legal work;

“[…]

ii. This practice contravenes the ancient principle that punishment must be proportionate not merely to social station but to moral guilt. It substitutes social appearance for culpable act, and procedural convenience for divine equity.

iii. As the Canonis Theodicea teaches with solemn authority, justice is not an act of destruction but a work of restoration. It seeks to elevate man, not degrade him (cf. Theodicea IV–V). A noble punished automatically is not purified but humiliated. The result is not obedience but alienation, and from alienation springs sedition.”

(sec.c.ii—iii, res.)