Summons: d'Arkent v. Ruthern

[yopplwasupxxx 5946]

SUMMONS

d’Arkent v. Ruthern

 

JOSEPH D’ARKENT

Represented by LEONARD VAN HALEN

 

DESIRES TO SUMMON THE FOLLOWING PARTY TO COURT;

 

MARY RUTHERN NEE CARRINGTON

@Branchio

 

ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLE(S), DOCTRINE(S), EDICT(S) OR ARTICLES OF LAW:

 

In late 1782, a document titled “The Letter of Release” was promulgated and signed by one Mary d’Arkent nee Carrington, Baroness of Carrington. The article stipulated that if this document had been found, the signatory was to be considered legally dead, making this document a de facto will. Within the will, the signatory states that “[I am forsaking] my position of Baroness of Carrington. Removing whatever claim I have for the title and beseeching my sister as regent to the title until my eldest son turns of age. My properties go to Mary Jane, my title goes to Mary Jane. My children are under custody and rightfully are to be guarded by Mary Jane and Mary Vespira”. The document also clearly stipulates the children of Mary d’Arkent nee Carrington, Baroness of Carrington and her husband (the plaintiff) Joseph d’Arkent, listed henceforth as Charles d’Arkent, Baron of Carrington, Philippa d’Arkent, Emma d’Arkent, Victoria d’Arkent, and James d’Arkent, are not to be under their rightful legal custodian and father, as well as their properties held in trust till they reach the age of majority not maintained by their rightful legal guardian but instead a distant family member.

 

In early 1783, Joseph d’Arkent, as represented by Leonard van Halen and joined by his father Peter d’Arkent, Duke of Sunholdt, formally approached Mary Ruthern nee Carrington in affirming his legal rights to the guardianship of the children and their estates as well as the legal rights of the eldest son Charles d’Arkent, Baron of Carrington to the properties of his deceased mother. Mary Ruthern nee Carrington refused, and under legal counsel Joseph d’Arkent issued a cease and desist order, where if after one month (Saint’s day) she did not relinquish custody of the children, properties, and title, legal action would be taken. After one month, no action has been performed by Mary Ruthern nee Carrington to rectify the situation, as so the party of Joseph d’Arkent seeks legal remedy.

 

The party of Joseph d’Arkent seeks the following actions performed,

 

I - The custody of the children of Mary d’Arkent nee Carrington, Baroness of Carrington, and Joseph d’Arkent returned to their legal guardian and father Joseph d’Arkent.

 

II - The legal guardianship of the properties held in trust for Charles d’Arkent, Baron of Carrington returned to his legal guardian and father Joseph d’Arkent.

 

III - The legal regency of the Barony of Carrington held in trust for Charles d’Arkent, Baron of Carrington returned to his legal guardian and father Joseph d’Arkent.

 

    The Party of Joseph d’Arkent seeks the aforementioned actions performed based on the following act(s), edict(s), order(s), and legislation,

 

I - THE FATHER MAINTAINS LEGAL OBLIGATION TO CARE FOR THE CHILDREN

 

According to ORC 302.014, “It is the obligation of the father to care for the child.” Nowhere does it state that this obligation can be absolved or taken away by the writ of a mother. Both law and legal precedence plays emphasis on the child being legal based on relation to the father, not the mother. See ORC 301.011 “ The following are citizens of the empire by birth; (A) Those born of an Orenian father...”, ORC 302.011 “...A child with a recognised filial relation to their father is deemed ‘legitimate’...”, and ORC 302.013 “Filiation is determined by the paternal line.” Therefore, it is the opinion of the plaintiff that the father takes precedence legally when determining guardianship and custody rather than both the wishes of the mother and other kin (such as a sister-in-law). This guardianship includes also all properties and titles held in trust for the children, whereas it is the father’s obligation to maintain such assets as trustee till they come of age.

 

II - PROPERTY IS INHERITED BY THE OBLIGATORY HEIR OF THE DECEASED

 

According to ORC 306.011 “The obligatory heirs are the male children and male descendants with respect to their parents and male ascendants.” As Charles d’Arkent, Baron of Carrington, is the eldest male child of Mary d’Arkent nee Carrington, Baroness of Carrington, it is therefore the legal right of Charles d’Arkent, Baron of Carrington, to receive the properties of his deceased mother. Nowhere in the ORC does it allow for inheritances to be divided up among individuals not considered the obligatory heirs (in this case, Charles d’Arkent, Baron of Carrington and James d’Arkent).

 

ON THE DESIRED DATE OF:

((To be discussed OOCly))

 

YOURS HUMBLY,

LEONARD VAN HALEN

3 Main St, Johnstown, Northland, Oren

[[yoppl the tarchar#5195]]

 

[John Ivory 4547]

HIH The Duke of Helena, Justice of the Central Circuit, shall meet with the party of the Plaintiff to determine fully the facts of the case and determine whether Summons shall proceed to full trial. 

[BenevolentManacles 2232]

A Selm bastard shuffles his papers in preparation for the defense for Mary Ruthern. He adjusts his spectacles, thumbing through the O.R.C. in the early hours of the morning.

 

He mutters under his breath, sipping from his Sunholdt Spiced Red, “How silly that we family must squabble. We shall find an agreement, I think I’ve got it,” he lays his finger on a particular code, grinning, sure that he had an amicable arrangement formulated for the squabbling cousins.

[Xarkly 17299]

SELM v. D’ARKENT
RESPONDING AFFIDAVIT

 

 

The Defendant Mary Jane d’Arkent,

Represented by Christiansen Wick Solicitors,

 

Submits this Responding Affidavit on this 1^st day of Sigismund’s End 1783 in response to the Summons issued by the Plaintiff Joseph Selm to address to the legal arguments made therein, and swears the contents to be true and accurate to the best of her belief. The Defendant thus rejects all claims made by the Plaintiff.

---

 

I: Custody of the d’Arkent Children

The Defendant rejects the Plaintiff’s claims that ORC302.014 affords him a paramount, exclusive right to custody over his children.

 

I.I: Termination of the Plaintiff’s Obligation

The Defendant submits that ORC302.014, providing “it is the obligation of the father to care for the child” is an obligation, and one that is not unassailable. The Court, for example, would not propose to enforce this provision were the father a convicted criminal, or a heretic likely to lead his child from the Canon, or someone who simply lacked the capacity to raise a child. Thus, there exists an inherent necessity to construe ORC302.014 with due regard for the circumstances of each case, and not in isolation. With this in mind, the Defendant will demonstrate to the Court that the Plaintiff’s cited obligation should be terminated under ORC304.028 – that of impossible conditions – with regard to the standard of care construed from ORC302.014;

 

I.I.I: The Standard of Care under ORC302.014

The Defendant submits that the standard of care for a primary caregiver and exclusive custodian – a status that the Plaintiff is pursuing – should be no less than the necessary provision of welfare to the best extent available that is of no detriment to the upbringing of the children. The Defendant is in possession of sworn testimonies from the Plaintiff’s children that verify he is unable to meet the threshold that should be required for him to be named sole and exclusive custodian of the children, thus rendering his obligation null under impossible conditions in accordance with ORC304.028. However, the Defendant submits that the standard of care should become significantly lower in the event that the Plaintiff is not seeking appointment as sole custodian, and that ‘to care’ can be satisfied by a far broader criteria.

 

I.II: Non-Exclusive Obligation

Should the Court find the Plaintiff’s cited obligation to be intact, the Defendant submits that this obligation to care is just that – an obligation to care. It is not a law enshrining him as sole custodian in a legal code that does not provide for any law on the custody of children, nor does it prevent the assignment of another suitable party as custodian. With a view to protecting the traditional Orenian family and providing both an essential maternal figure and paternal figure for the d’Arkent children, the Defendant submits that custody should be afforded to both the Plaintiff and the Defendant with due respect to the de-facto will of the Deceased as primary care-giver of the d’Arkent children and allow the Plaintiff to pursue his obligation with a lower standard of care. The Defendant is in possession of sworn testimonies verifying her relationship with the d’Arkent children as a trusted maternal figure, rendering the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant is a ‘distant family member’ and an inappropriate custodian entirely false.

 

II: Regency of the Deceased’s Estate

The Defendant requests clarification regarding the Plaintiff’s allegations that the Deceased attempted to “divide up inheritance among individuals not considered obligatory heirs”. In the Deceased’s de-facto will, inheritance of her estate is reiterated to lawfully pass to her eldest son – Charles d’Arkent – which is duly accepted by the Plaintiff in his summons, and the Defendant. Nowhere in the Deceased’s de-facto will or through her conduct is inheritance assigned to another party.

 

Instead, the Deceased appointed the Defendant as lawful regent of her estate. The Court is asked to note ORC708.02, providing: “A designated regent is chosen by the capable lord, to administer and rule in the name of the lord or his heir in the case of incapability or the office holder. The person or persons designated to rule as regent is to be defined and listed with the will of the office holder”. The Defendant is in possession of verification that the Deceased was the recognized capable lord of her estate, and that her will is explicit in appointing the Defendant as lawful regent until Charles d’Arkent – who bears no objection to such appointment – reaches maturity. This appointment, the Court will note, is not subject to any existing familial considerations and is made at the sole discretion of the assignor. There exists no law which the Plaintiff can invoke to negate this lawful appointment, and there is nothing which can afford him any rights to regency over the Deceased’s estate. As far as the law is concerned, the Deceased could have named a Dwarven chicken farmer in Northland she has never met, and it would remain perfectly legal.

 

Regards,

Sir Konstantin Wick MHC

Ekaterinburg, New Reza

[MCVDK 2851]

RULING OF D’ARKENT v. RUTHERN