Request for Judicial Review Granted: Residence Status

[Caranthir_ 2533]

In view of 'REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ON RESIDENCE STATUS';

 

Dear Edward Selm & Associates,

Your request for judicial review has been granted. The Supreme Court will be accepting amicus briefs from the public at large and any interested parties for the next three months. After this period has ended, the court shall review the facts of the case, the arguments presented in the briefs, and the original request by Mr. Selm.

 

As with the previous request for judicial review on election precedence, no injunction shall be granted at this time. The duly elected members and government shall begin their terms as usual, pending the outcome of this litigation.

 

Kind Regards,

Amadeus d'Aryn, SCJ

[BenevolentManacles 2232]

PETITION FOR EVIDENCE VIA ORDER OF THE COURT

 

It is our opinion that the registry of voters valid and invalid, in it's purest form, should be made available to those filing amicus briefs, for evidentiary purposes. We cannot rightfully discuss the precise nature of the use, or misuse, of residential or other addresses at a level coherent with Imperial jurisprudence without the foundation of all the discussion, and the evidence around it, made available to us. We ask that the Court issues an order to the Secretary of Civil Affairs and/or to the Magistrate of Providence to provide this documentation before proceeding with amicus briefs.

 

Signed,

Edward Selm

[yopplwasupxxx 5946]

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN OPPOSITION OF PETITIONER

_____________________________

 

To Chief Justice Gray and the Supreme Court of the Holy Orenian Empire,

 

We, the Ministry of Justice as represented by the Attorney-General, submit this brief as amicus curiae in opposition to the petitioner. It is our opinion that the use of property ownership to determine citizenship by the serving Magistrate of the City of Providence (George Galbraith) was both a valid and legal procedure, and should not be called to a new election or recount. We hold this opinion on the basis of the following principle(s), doctrine(s), edict(s), and article(s) of law,

 

I - TYPES OF PROPERTY ARE NEITHER DEFINED NOR REGULATED WITHIN THE ORC

 

Nowhere in the Orenian Revised Code are types of property defined or construed. While there is a brief mention of “other properties” within the municipal charter for the City of Providence, this by no means indicates that these properties cannot also constitute as dwellings or residencies. To define and distinguish between types of property when both the Orenian Revised Code and the municipal charter of the City of Providence do not is an overstep of the court’s power and purview. All properties must be treated the same legally without substantial distinction unless done so textually by the provided law, whether from the Orenian Revised Code or the municipal charter for the City of Providence.

__________

 

II - THERE ARE NO LAWS PROHIBITING RESIDENCY IN ANY FORM OF PROPERTY OWNED BY THE INDIVIDUAL

 

Even if properties can be legally defined into types, there are currently no laws prohibiting individuals from living in any sort of type of property, whether it be classed as a ‘residency’, ‘shop’, and so on. For the courts to create now a prohibition on where an individual can live would be therefore the creation of a law or regulation, which is beyond the scope of the court’s jurisdiction. Rather, all properties must be accepted as being able to be residences as per both the Orenian Revised Code and the municipal charter for the City of Providence.

__________
 

III - POSSESSION AND USE OF A PROPERTY IS LEGAL PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP FOR A MAGISTRATE

 

According to the Orenian Revised Code, “[the] possession and continued use of property within the Empire for a period as so judged by a magistrate can be used as legal proof of citizenship if so requested by the citizen” (ORC 301.01B). There is no specification to what type of property, rather to property as a whole. Therefore, a magistrate can legally judge an individual as a citizen if they own property over a certain period of time that is itself determined by the magistrate. As George Galbraith was appointed Magistrate of Providence at the time of election (1797), he was well in his legal right to judge an individual’s citizenship based on property ownership. To deny him this power is a blatant breach of his legal rights and duties prescribed by the Orenian Revised Code. It would also be a breach of a citizen’s right to use property ownership as proof of their citizenship by government agents.

__________

 

We conclude with the following points: types of properties are not defined in either law documents, and so must be treated as having the same legal attributes. There are no laws that prohibit residency of any form of property owned by an individual, and it is the right of the Crown-appointed magistrate to use possession of a property as a legal indicator of citizenship (as well as a right of the individual to use their property as legal proof of citizenship). It is by these reasons that We, the Ministry of Justice as represented by the Attorney-General, urge the court to reject this petition and uphold the validity of the results of the 1797 municipal elections for the City of Providence.

 

Yours Humbly,

RT. HON. ATTORNEY-GENERAL R. A. FITZPETER, J.D. SSE

POLYCARP COURTHOUSE, 2 VINMARK ROUSSARD ST, PROVIDENCE

[[yoppl the tarchar#5195]]

[MCVDK 2851]

RULING ON THE PETITION FOR EVIDENCE

After careful consideration of the Supreme Court in relation to the petition of evidence brought forth within the Judicial Review of Residence Status. It has been unanimously ruled within the Supreme Court, that all requested ballots will not be released to the public within the above mentioned case. 

 

The Court holds the opinion within the above mentioned review, that the ballots cast within the election, of which has been requested to be presented through the petition, is irrelevant to the argument required to be presented within the review. 

 

As delivered and penned by Justice Baelius

Joined in opinion with Chief Justice Gray & Justice d’Aryn  

[BenevolentManacles 2232]

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE CITIZENS OF PROVIDENCE

 

 

IN CONSIDERATION OF PRECEDENT

 

It is made clear in the ruling on The Judicial Review of Election Cancellation and Ballot Nullification that this Court understands that to discard legal ballots in a national election after they have already been certified is a violation of O.R.C. 301.041. 

 

“The Secretary of Civil Affairs is not permitted to nullify ballots wherein their legitimacy has been confirmed prior to the nullification, as such shall be in violation of the principles of law wherein the right to suffrage and right to vote, combined with the clarification provided through the Pompourelian Reforms, explicitly prevents the Secretary of Civil Affairs to take the mentioned action within the electoral process of the Holy Orenian Empire. “ [Ruling on the Request for Judicial Review: Election Cancellation and Ballot Nullification]

 

One may consider that the requesting party would propose a ruling that is in violation of this precedent, when in fact, it is not. This precedent lays out plainly that it is based on 301.041, which is explicitly reserved for national elections, and therefore the cancellation of ballots is not, by virtue of the aforementioned precedence, illegal, and because no similar law applies to local elections, it would be irresponsible of the court to uphold this precedent.

 

The only mention of the rights to suffrage in the Imperial Charter for the City of Providence is the following;

 

“That the city legislature be considered a parliamentary body with the power to legislate concerning inner matters concerning itself, as well as concerning the frequency, manner, place, and the suffrage of local elections so long as these rules do not conflict with Our charter.”

 

As the Assembly has not met even for the first time, no legislation could conceivably exist to further clarify the rights of suffrage in Providence. It is clear that by the verbiage of this line that the Crown intends for the City Assembly to define that right to suffrage, and not the Courts, who would be legislating from the bench should they elect to do so.

 

Should the above not be the opinion of the court, We believe, by virtue of O.R.C. 301.041, if applicable to city elections in the opinion of this court, that when votes are validated that should not have been validated, it not only violates 301.041 to nullify those ballots per this precedent, but it also violates 301.041 to certify an election where ballots that should not have been counted were instead counted. If a vote of a single person, who rightfully owns a residence, can be put up against someone who may explicitly not legally vote in an election, then the person who rightfully owns a resident is de facto disenfranchised by that election, rendering it an unfair, and un-free election, requiring a new election.

 

ON DEFINING RESIDENCE AND RESIDENTS

 

All laws passed by assemblies and municipal legislatures in the City of Helena are defunct, as Helena no longer exists. We may only examine statutes which apply to the Empire and to Providence.

 

There are two statutes in the Oren Revised Code by which we can construe the definition of residence.

 

207.01 - On Vagrancy

207.011 - Where an individual intentionally lives the life of a vagrant, participating in improper begging, and illegally staying in residences and towns, this shall be the crime of vagrancy, a misdemeanor.

 

604.01 - On Voting Rights and Registration

604.011 - All citizens of the Holy Orenian Empire over the age of 18 who are registered to an address have the right to vote in national elections in the province of their residence.

 

And one line from the Imperial Charter for the City of Providence by which we can do the same.

That this city government be composed thirdly of a clerk, who shall be appointed by the city assembly, and who shall…

...

II. Administrate the collection of local taxes or rents, and sale of residences and other properties.

 

From O.R.C. 207.01 we can see one who does not have a residence but resides in one illegally may be guilty of vagrancy, from which can easily construe residency to be defined as a place of living, per the typical definition of vagrancy and it’s intention under this law.

 

From O.R.C. 604.01 we can see that residing in a residence, or a place of living, within a province of the Empire entitles one to vote in national elections. From here we can define a residency as a static property that may not exist wherever a person chooses their residency exists. If this were not true, a person could claim residency in different places at will in order to vote where they pleased, which could not have been the legislative intention of this statute.

 

From the lines from the Imperial Charter, we can see that both residences and other properties exist in the City of Providence. Therefore, we can define residencies further as properties within which there are reasonable facilities to properly house an individual or individuals, and not as other places, that do not meet these standards.

 

It is also clear that, in addition to these definitions, we must define reasonable accommodations for living to include space to sleep, eat, and rest.

 

In conclusion on the definition of residencies, this Court should recognize that a residency must be defined as or something near to;

 

A single building, room, or apartment that may reasonably serve as a place to sleep, eat and rest.

 

Now we come to the issue of the relationship between the ‘resident’ and a ‘residence.’

 

It should be the opinion of this court that if one does not reside statically in a residence within a city, then they could not conceivably be construed as being a resident of that city. If instead it were the case that a person could own any property in a city, and not reside in it, then foreigners who owned property in a city would be, de facto, residents of that city. This would be an immeasurably dangerous precedent to set, and if the court were compelled to set it despite the danger it poses, first it should consider that some definitions must stand on the basis of common sense, and then consider that opposition to it would have no statutory basis.

 

THE CASE’S MERIT

 

On the day of the Mayoral election, multiple witnesses reported people declaring addresses which were not residential addresses.

The addresses used by several registered voters in the recent election were not residences. The Imperial Charter for the City of Providence explicitly states that,

 

“That this city government be composed firstly of a lord mayor, who shall be elected from among the residents of this city, and who shall… “

 

Those who voted in this most recent election using addresses not reasonably defined as residences were not residents. Therefore, their votes were illegally added to the vote. The only reasonable action this court should take is to order the cancellation of ballots which were not legal.
 

IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

 

I. DEFINITIONS OF TYPES OF PROPERTY MUST EXIST

 

It is the intention of the Attorney-General to make the argument that because the Oren Revised Code, or no other law, does not define specifically what a residence is, that anything may be a residence.

However, there are immeasurable amounts of things in law that the Oren Revised Code does not explicitly define.  The O.R.C does not define prison or jail, for example. Shall I now argue in court that when my client is sentenced to prison, because it is not defined, his prison shall be wherever he pleases? It would be poor practice for the Courts to set the standard that if something is not explicitly defined in the O.R.C., then it has no definition. 

Furthermore, the Attorney-General proposes that because residencies are not defined in the Oren Revised Code, then they must be defined as what he claims. He says that any property may constitute a dwelling or residence, meaning a residence may be defined as any property. This is a contradictory argument that has no basis in law.

We must instead investigate our basic language and common sense, and if we must reference law, then reference the aforementioned laws on vagrancy. If a man illegally sleeps on a park bench, is that bench now a residency?

 

 II. THERE NEED NOT BE A LAW DEFINING RESIDENCY FOR A DEFINITION TO EXIST

 

I have defined residency explicitly above. The Attorney-General claims that laying out the definition of legal verbiage is not within the power of the court, but that is precisely it’s job. A law is drafted, and when questions arise about it’s precise applicability or legitimacy, it is the court’s duty to decide what the law does, or says, and whether it is constitutional. There is precedence for the Courts even directly rearranging government, let alone defining a word, where they have found the law must be clearly defined and followed upon that definition, by order of the Court. In the opinion of the Court, drafted by Chief Justice John d'Arkent, in the ruling on the Judicial Review Concerning City Rights, the Court freely defines the conflict between different policies and legislation to mean something other than what they would otherwise say separately. And what, the Courts cannot define a single word?

 

III. SUFFRAGE IS NOT GUARANTEED IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

 

There are only statutes defining suffrage rights in national elections, but none in municipal ones. It is excruciatingly evident that George Galbraith may have, or may have not had the right to determine an individual’s citizenship based on property ownership, but that is irrelevant. The Imperial Charter for the City of Providence makes guarantees of suffrage only to residents and not citizens. It may even have been his right to determine what is, and what is not a residency, but he did not (he likely should have,) and now, here we are.

 

Signed,

Edward Selm

[argonian 14254]

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF A FRIEND OF THE COURT

 

To Chief Justice Gray and the Supreme Court of the Holy Orenian Empire,

 

It is clear that there exists within the body of Orenian law some distinction between residential property and commercial property. Where exactly this line is drawn and what exactly these differences mean to the electoral process, my party takes no interest, but that such a distinction exists is clear from the law.

 

Firstly, as has already been pointed out, the city charter where this election took place acknowledges that there exist 'other properties' which are not residential in nature.

 

Imperial Charter for the City of Providence:

'II. Administrate the collection of local taxes or rents, and sale of residences and other properties.'

 

This mention of 'other properties' necessarily implies that not all properties are 'residences'. My party also asserts that this mention of other properties refers to other immovable properties, i.e buildings and fixed stalls, rather than merely possessions, as it is unknown in the Empire or any prior capital city for citizens to be taxed on any moveable possessions. To my knowledge, in Providence the only taxes levied those on houses and shops, backing up the assertion that these 'other properties' refer to buildings and the like, rather than moveable possessions. 

 

We see a further distinction in how different types of properties are treated by national law, for example in the the Evictions Act, 1772. 

 

Evictions Act 1772:

'ARTICLE I: GENERAL DEFINITIONS
      2.  “Eviction” shall be construed to mean  the ejection of a person from a building in which they reside or do business;

...

ARTICLE III: REASONABLE EXCEPTIONS TO CH303.023
      1.  The following shall constitute reasonable exceptions to CH303.023 as provided for the amendment in Article II a., and shall warrant a lawful eviction when:

           e.  The property is a business failing to meet communal expectations by way of poor trading practices;'

 

Here we see the law recognising first in its definitions that one may be the 'occupant' of a building in the sense of owning it while not actually 'residing' within that building. Merely being marked down as the occupant of a property on the ledger does not imply that property is your permanent residence, or even a residence of yours at all. 

 

Secondly, the law specifically treats properties used for doing business differently to properties used as residences. The occupant of a property in which he only does business may be evicted for poor trading practices, but the resident of a property may not be. So therefore there exists a clear legal distinction between a property used for commerce and a property used for residence, however whether these distinctions are based on how the city designates these properties or how the owner uses them is unclear.

 

In summary, I conclude that there exists a legal distinction between commercial and residential properties, and therefore even owning a building within a city does not necessarily imply one owns a residence in, i.e is a resident of, the city.

 

YOURS FAITHFULLY,
Samuel T. Savoyard