APPEAL: THE CROWN V. TSECSAR

[KamikazeReaper 457]

 

APPEAL: THE CROWN V. TSECSAR

 

6th of Sun’s Smile, 1833

 

 

THE DAME, 

 

Represented by HENRIK KOMNENOS of the KOMNENOS AT LAW,

 

 

 

DESIRES TO APPEAL THE FOLLOWING RULING;

 

Ruling on the Crown v. Tsecsar

 

 

ON THE GROUNDS OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLE(S), DOCTRINE(S), EDICT(S) OR ARTICLES OF LAW:

 

 

 

-MISTRAL:

 

 

 

The Dame, represented through Komnenos at law, does hereby file an Appeal against the Ruling on The Crown v. Tsecsar before the Supreme Court of the Holy Orenian Empire, on the basis of mistrial.

 

 

 

Firstly, it is the opinion of Komnenos at law and its client that the declaration of this Ruling made by the presiding Judge of this case was wholly illegal, as the charges brought forward were mislabeled, the punishment was wrongly issued, and there was no formal submission of evidence given to the lawyer of the Dame, as the law dictates during the Swift Justice Act and no opportunity for the defence to ever respond to the prosecution's wildly incorrect allegations regarding the evidence. And the Chief Justice had no legal right to enter the lower courts.  

 

 

 

Furthermore, it is the opinion of Komnenos at Law that the presiding Judge did not follow the Trial Procedure, as the presiding judge was in fact the chief justice, a member of the supreme court; it is not allowed by law for the Supreme Court to preside over the lower courts.

 

 

Also, Komnenos at law wishes to question the reason for why the victim himself was never brought up as a witness. The victim, Konstantin Baruch, was the main reason for the charges brought forward by the Crown.

 

The crown sought to press charges against the Damel

 

• 202.05B - Where an individual intentionally or negligently commits such an act as to bring about the crippling disfigurement of another, or the removal of multiple digits, this shall be mayhem in the second degree, a felony. 

 

• 202.02B - Where an individual intentionally commits upon another an unlawful act of violence which brings about lasting but not permanent injury, incapacitates for any length of time, or utilizes a dangerous weapon, this shall be battery of the second degree, a misdemeanor.

 

The chief justice issued the verdict:

 

Dame Viktoriya Tsecsar (henceforth; the defendant), is found guilty on the felony charge of mayhem in the second degree (205.05B), but found not guilty on the misdemeanor charge of battery in the second degree (202.02B) under the premise that evidence does not provide reason to believe that this act was intentional.

 

However, she was found guilty on mayhem in the second degree but was punished with first degree, which holds life time banishment but second degree does not, as seen here:

 201.03 - Of the offenses enumerated herein, each is classified according to its degree, of

which there exist three, and upon which culpability and just punishment shall be evaluated.

The applicable sanction for each crime and degree of injury are recorded within Title I. These degrees are:

201.03A - The third degree offense, of the least severity.

201.03B - The second degree offense, of middling severity.

201.03C - The first degree offense, of the greatest severity.

201.04C - Felonies, of great severity, include the appropriated sentences: monetary fine

up to fifty thousand mina, disbarring from public office for up to a lifetime,

confinement to prison for up to a lifetime, banishment up to a lifetime, conscription up

to a lifetime, designated service to faith up to a lifetime, flogging up to sixty lashes,

birching up to sixty lashes, pillory up to three hours, branding by hot iron on a limb,

chest, buttocks, or face, execution by hanging.

 

Komnenos at law also wishes to state that based on the law,

202.05 - On Mayhem

202.05A - Where an individual intentionally or negligently commits such an act as to

bring about the superficial disfigurement of another, or the removal of a single digit,

this shall be mayhem in the third degree, a misdemeanor.

202.05B - Where an individual intentionally or negligently commits such an act as to

bring about the crippling disfigurement of another, or the removal of multiple digits,

this shall be mayhem in the second degree, a felony.

202.05C - Where an individual intentionally or negligently commits such an act as to

bring about the dismemberment of another, the destruction of an eye, castration, or

other irreparable loss of an appendage or organ, this shall be mayhem in the first

degree, a felony.

 

the Dame was issued the wrong punishment.
However as it has been proven by letters between the Dame and the family of Lord Baruch,

that he was in fact not hit with any of the tropes that would state it should be in the second degree. It should have been in the third degree, meaning a misdemeanor, which means that the banishment of the Dame shouldn't even have happened in the first place.

 

 

-LEGAL ERRORS IN THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S DECISION IN SUMMARY:

 

 

• The Dame was punished with a first degree felony where it should have been a third degree.

•  The Chief Justice had no legal right to lower himself to the lower courts and handle this case.
  
   

 

 

 

IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING:

 

 

 

-Komnenos at Law, on behalf of the Dame does hereby ask the Supreme Court to overturn the Ruling on the Crown v. Tsecsar and to declare and order that the Dame’s life time is banishment lifted and is welcome back into the Empire, and that the Chief Justice himself
offers a written Amende Honorable as a form of compensation to the Dame.

 

YOURS HUMBLY,

 

Henrik Komnenos on behalf of KOMNENOS AT LAW,

 

KOMNENOS AT LAW, PROVIDENCE

 

[[KamikazeReaper#6108]]

[Mescaffier 6197]

 

 

A behemoth woman sat hunched over the edge of a table, wearing a cigar on her lips and piles of fur hefted over both shoulders. A man sat by her side, along with a few others - still and silent. 

 

 

"Vor v zakonye. Senartz."

 

"Mm, Osric, padrevari?"

 

He passed a copy of the parchment over the table, bound in a carnelian lace and stamped with wax. The man beside her broke it apart, drawling on to read through it as she sifted through herbs.

 

"Erhae ve byki. Ter lapae -- ve Halcourt, niet vypolnit' anmokiy, asere prishit'."

 

"Sic semper tyrannis. Justice befalls tyrants. Let us ride, Brethren. Nache Derne!"

 

Spoiler

oliver gonna swim with the FISHIES😼 😼😼💅

 

[Herod 1417]

Kaustantin Baruch frowns, not because of the attempt to appeal the ruling, but rather because they wrote his complicated name wrong. “Imbeciles.” He commented.

[NotJcbeno 203]

Osric Tsecsar simply listened to his mamej's words, waiting as his arms crossed across his chest. His visage mostly emotionless as he perked up.

 

"Mamej, does this change anything for us?"

[Mannyy 982]

“Illegal? Look, Olivier… They think you made a mistake.” The Baroness squinted as she told her husband about it. @DevoutChorale_

[kuerbis 3802]

"I feel like this is mere corruption," mumbled Anne Caroline before putting the copy aside.

[Minuvas 3193]

Minuvas would nod approvingly from his Office remarking privately  "Some Justice from the Lord-Mayor it seems..."

[___South___ 87]

Dmitriev Novikov Tsecsar sat in his manor, reading over the appeal with his infant son in one arm while his daughter played in the background. "Interesting. Do they have a habit of issuing the wrong punishments for the wrong offenses?... Right." He'd turn around and place the appeal on his nightstand, and went back to taking care of his family.

[sergisala 3451]

MOTION TO DISMISS

 

THE CROWN, 

Represented by SIR CHARLES GALBRAITH of THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,

 

        DESIRES TO DISMISS THE FOLLOWING SUIT;

APPEAL: THE CROWN V. TSECSAR

 

ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLE(S), DOCTRINE(S), EDICT(S) OR ARTICLES OF LAW:

 

To the Right Honourable Justices of the Supreme Court (henceforth referred to as the “Court”), it is the right and ability of a party within any form of formal Court to file a Motion to Dismiss. As such, the Ministry of Justice on behalf of The Crown (henceforth referred to as the “Prosecution”), a Motion to Dismiss is hereby filed to the Supreme Court to challenge the Appeal of The Crown v. Tsecsar that has been filed by Dame Tsecsar (henceforth referred to as the “Defendant”).

 

The Prosecution has found many faults within the Appeal filed by the Defendant,  which has caused the Appeal as a whole to remain invalid and therefore subject to Dismissal by the Court. 

 

The Prosecution sees fit that the Supreme Court evaluates the Appeal upon the following notions.

 

INTRODUCTION - ON THE LEGALITY OF THE RULING OF THE CROWN V. TSECSAR

 

The Prosecution has found that the Ruling of the Crown v. Tsecsar (henceforth referred to as the “Ruling”) is completely legal, as it complies with the statutory law and with all the jurisprudential requirements that all the Rulings of the Imperial Courts must have in Case-law: the Ruling states the charges, the verdict, and the sentencing that has been decided by the presiding Justice, and all of these requirements perfectly comply with the law.

 

The Prosecution will now proceed in this notion to examine the different arguments brought by the Defendant and respond to them appropriately.

 

I - ON THE ALLEGED MISLABELLING OF THE CHARGES STATED BY THE DEFENDANT

 

The Prosecution has found that the first argument brought by the Defendant in order to challenge the Ruling is not just inconsistent but also blatantly false. 

 

Furthermore, the Prosecution stated since the beginning of the procedure what charges were being brought and the Chief Justice read the charges aloud when it was required by the Trial Procedure in presence of both parties (as can be read in the judicial record of the trial).

 

The charges stated by the Chief Justice were the same ones brought by the Prosecution, i.e., felony charge of mayhem in the second degree (O.R.C. 205.05B) and misdemeanor charge of battery in the second degree (O.R.C. 202.02B).

 

Finally, the Prosecution highlights the fact that the Defendant has brought no evidence (such as sworn affidavits or testimonies) of any manner in order to prove before the Court that there was indeed a lack of mislabelling of the charges or to contradict the evidence presented by the Prosecution through an attachment to this Motion (See Sworn Affidavits #1, #2 and #3 attached to this Motion). 

 

II - ON THE ALLEGED WRONGLY ISSUANCE OF THE PUNISHMENT IN THE RULING

 

The Prosecution has found that the second argument of the Defendant to challenge the Ruling is simply not true, because the Defendant was convicted to a felony charge of mayhem in the second degree (205.05B), and criminal offenses of felony severity have, amongst their possible penalties: monetary fine up to fifty thousand mina and banishment up to a lifetime (O.R.C. 201.04C), the same ones that have been imposed in the Ruling.

 

In addition, and simply to properly explain to the Court why the amount of 2500 Marks imposed in the Ruling does not surpass the penalty limit of 50000 Marks, the Prosecution highlights the fact that the Edict of Revaluation (1811) establishes that “any monetary amount prescribed by law, edict, or other act of the government prior to the 1796 evacuation of Arcas be revalued to five percent of its original sum”, that is, in this case, 2500 (which is equivalent to the 5% of 50000).

 

III - ON THE ALLEGED LACK OF FORMAL SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE FROM THE PROSECUTION TO THE DEFENDANT

 

The Prosecution has found this third argument of the Defendant to challenge the Ruling not just false but also an insult to our intelligence and a lack of respect to the truth behind the public prosecutors that work tirelessly for the Empire.

 

Specifically, the Prosecution states that there was indeed a formal submission of evidence prior to trial from the Prosecution to the Defendant’s lawyer. This was done through the exchange of the books of evidence as required by the Legal Procedure Act and the Gray Amendments Act and, in this case, through the handing of the Book of Evidence of the Prosecution to the Defendant’s lawyer (See the Book of Evidence of the Prosecution attached to this Motion), as can be read in the sworn affidavits submitted by the Chief Justice and other individuals present in the public that have been attached to this Motion, when the trial took place (See the Sworn Affidavits #1, #2 and 3 attached to this Motion).

 

Finally, the Prosecution highlights the fact that the Defendant has brought no evidence (such as sworn affidavits or testimonies) of any manner in order to prove before the Court that there was indeed a lack of formal submission of evidence or to contradict the evidence presented by the Prosecution through an attachment to this Motion. 

 

IV - ON THE ALLEGED LACK OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE DEFENSE TO RESPOND TO THE PROSECUTION’S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE EVIDENCE

 

The Prosecution has found this fourth argument of the Defendant to challenge the Ruling an insult to the prestige of the Imperial Courts and to the dignity, honour and respect of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

 

The Prosecution states that this argument is completely false and that, the Chief Justice did indeed allow the Defense to respond to the Prosecution’s allegations regarding the evidence  (See the Sworn Affidavits #1, #2 and 3 attached to this Motion). In fact, the Defense had plenty of opportunities to prove their arguments during the trial.

 

Finally, the Prosecution highlights the fact that the Defendant has brought no evidence (such as sworn affidavits or testimonies) of any manner in order to prove before the Court that there was indeed a lack of opportunity for the Defense to respond to the Prosecution’s allegations regarding the evidence or to contradict the evidence presented by the Prosecution through an attachment to this Motion. 

 

V - ON THE ALLEGED LACK OF LEGAL RIGHT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE TO HEAR A CASE IN FIRST INSTANCE DUE TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF A MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION AND ON THE CORRECT FOLLOWING OF THE TRIAL PROCEDURE

 

The Prosecution states that apart from the formal details contained in the same (such as the date or the title of when it was issued), the Ruling also contains a paragraph titled “Statement from the Court'' where the presiding Justice (i.e., the Chief Justice) justifies the legal reasoning behind the replacement of the initial Circuit Judge by himself due to the fact that the initial Circuit Judge expressed disregard for judicial precedent (Cf. Ruling of the Supreme Court on The Crown v. Brandt & D’Emyth), which is unacceptable as the Judiciary Act of 1740 (O.R.C. 610.010: “Any verdicts of the Supreme Court shall become binding interpretations of law, unless overturned by subsequent sessions of the Supreme Court”) establishes that the Rulings of the Supreme Court are binding for the lower courts, and the Prosecution filed a Motion for Judicial Disqualification in voce for that reason (as can be read in the judicial record of the trial).

 

Immediately after, the Supreme Court ruled upon the Motion for Judicial Disqualification in voce and decided that the initial Circuit Judge was to be replaced by a new presiding Justice for the reasons expressed by the Prosecution in his Motion. The new presiding Justice that was selected by the Supreme Court was the Chief Justice Halcourt, who immediately conducted the trial and issued its subsequent Ruling.

 

The facts contained in the two previous paragraphs are confirmed by the Sworn Affidavits presented by the Prosecution and that are attached to this Motion (See the Sworn Affidavits #1, #2 and 3 attached to this Motion).

 

In addition to the acceptance of the Motion for Judicial Disqualification against the Circuit Judge, another legal framework that justifies the right of the Chief Justice to become the presiding Justice of a case is the fact that there is no legal provision in statutory law that forbids the Supreme Court Justices from assuming cases in first instance on behalf of the Circuit Court.

 

Let us not forget that the law is not merely the statutory law (i.e., the Acts of the Imperial Diet or equivalent) but also the Rulings of the Imperial Courts, which in the case of the Supreme Court their Rulings are binding (not just for the lower courts but for literally everyone as per O.R.C. 610.010) and become part of the Case-law and stare decisis, which means that they bind all the lower Courts and all the legal operators in our legal system, including the Circuit Court. That means that the Ruling of the Supreme Court on the Motion for Judicial Disqualification in The Crown v. Tsecsar also produces binding effects and that, from now on, unless there is a statute (such an Act of the Imperial Diet) that forbids this the Supreme Court can, upon an acceptance of a Motion for Judicial Disqualification, replace a presiding Judge for another on the basis of disregard for judicial precedent and order the case to be tried once again.

 

With regard to the Trial Procedure, the Prosecution finds that it was completely followed: both parties rose for the Justice upon his arrival, the Justice then read the charges, the Defendant pleaded not guilty, the Prosecution and the Defendant’s opening statements were made, each party made their submissions in turn, of witnesses and evidence, with proper examination and cross-examinations of the same. Objections were also allowed to be issued by both parties and, basically, all the legal requirements of the procedure were followed correctly by the presiding Justice.

 

For all the above reasons, the Prosecution strongly believes that the Trial Procedure was followed correctly and that the Chief Justice had the right to become the presiding Justice of the trial and that, as such, these arguments of the Defendant are invalid.

 

VI - ON THE LACK OF PROPOSITION OF THE VICTIM AS A WITNESS IN THE TRIAL 

 

While that allegation is certainly true, the Prosecution states that the freedom of propositions of witnesses to the Court belongs to both parties, and that the Defense did not propose the victim as a witness to the Court either. In consequence, this argument is invalid, as if this was truly concerning for the Defense they could have proposed the victim as a witness in the trial.

 

Furthermore, the Prosecution states that while the victim was not summoned in the trial as a witness, the testimony was not essential in order to destroy the presumption of innocence of the Defendant, as that the incriminating nature of statements made by all the other witnesses that were summoned by the Court during the trial towards the Defendant was more than enough to prove the facts of the case, as most of them were direct witnesses in the crime scene who saw how the crime took place and all of them incriminated the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime (See the Book of Evidence of the Prosecution attached to this Motion).

 

Finally, the Prosecution states that the reasons behind the lack of proposition from the Prosecution of the victim of the crime was the fact that the victim lives in the Kingdom of Hanseti-Ruska and was not available at the time the trial took place to attend the same.

 

VII - ON THE ALLEGED WRONGFUL PRESSING OF CHARGES AGAINST THE DEFENDANT; OR ON THE CONFUSION OF THE DEFENDANT REGARDING THE DIFFERENT SEVERITY TYPES OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES IN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM

 

The Prosecution states that the Defendant is not right when states that the conviction of the Defendant for a crime in second degree (in this case, for the Crime of Mayhem) automatically means that the criminal offense is a Misdemeanor because that is its classification in terms of severity as per the Lex Criminalis. That is simply not true, as the Lex Criminalis contains lots of criminal offenses whose severity do not necessarily correlate with the classification of offenses in infractions, misdemeanors, felonies and treason. What truly defines a criminal offense in the aforementioned classification is whether the literal article of the law mentions that it is an infraction, a misdemeanor, felony or a treason charge, and not whether it is of first, second or third degree.

 

In other words, a felony charge (such as O.R.C. 202.05B -Mayhem-) is still a felony charge, regardless of the degree, and must be treated as such from a legal point of view. 

 

In this case, the very own literal article of the law that regulates the criminal offense mentions very clearly that this is a felony charge: “202.05B - Where an individual intentionally or negligently commits such an act as to bring about the crippling disfigurement of another, or the removal of multiple digits, this shall be mayhem in the second degree, a felony” 

 

As mentioned at the beginning of this Motion, the penalties imposed by the Ruling comply with the Lex Criminalis of the Orenian Revised Code (as lifetime banishment and 2500 marks fine are penalties that can be imposed in a felony mayhem charge) and, as such, are perfectly legal.

 

For all the above reasons, the Prosecution states that the Defendant was convicted to the correct punishment.

 

Finally, the Prosecution invites the Defense to read and study the jurisprudence of the Imperial Courts more carefully, as stating the contrary of what the Prosecution has stated in the previous paragraphs demonstrates a lack of the most elementary principles of imperial law. 

 

VIII - ON THE REPETITION OF FACTS THAT WERE ALREADY MENTIONED BY THE DEFENDANT IN FIRST INSTANCE AND ON THE LACK OF EVIDENCE BROUGHT BY THE DEFENDANT 

 

The Prosecution does hereby invoke the following article of law from the Legal Procedure Act of 1776:

 

“An Appeal shall not constitute a second, unchanged hearing of the original matter, and shall instead be submitted on the grounds of;

      i. A mistrial, whereby a trial was conducted and judgment rendered in violation with Court procedure prescribed in this bill, such as a juror failing to disclose a past interaction with a party;

      ii. On the basis of law, whereby the Justice was negligent in that they acted outside their jurisdiction, failed to follow law, interpreted the law in a way that can be considered objectively unreasonable, or otherwise conducted themselves in a way that can, at the discretion of the Supreme Court, constitute a breach of  judicial obligations;

      iii. On the basis of new facts, whereby significant new information relevant to the case has come to light since the original judgment.” [Section II.V.b of the Legal Procedure Act of 1772].

 

As can be read in the previous paragraph, an Appeal can only be filed on the basis of a mistrial, on the grounds of law or on the grounds of new facts.

 

Having the aforementioned statute in consideration, the Prosecution states that the Appeal filed by the Defendant states the following: “However as it has been proven by letters between the Dame and the family of Lord Baruch, that he was in fact not hit with any of the tropes that would state it should be in the second degree”. 

 

It is the opinion of the Prosecution that this statement made by the Defendant in the Appeal does not constitute a new fact, as it was already alleged in first instance during the trial and that, as such, this argument cannot be used to justify any Appeal, as it does not constitute a mistrial or is done on the grounds of law, and only it would be viable on the grounds of new facts, when in reality it is not.

 

As such, any logical consequence of this last argument used by the Defendant is also invalid in an Appeal Procedure such as this one and, as such, it cannot be justified to make any other argument before the Court.

 

Finally, the Prosecution wishes to state that the Defendant has brought barely no evidence during the Trial and that has brought no evidence at all during this Appeal Procedure, and that the Appeal is mainly based on factual allegations that are not sustained by any evidence, as the Defendant has presented no evidence to the Court, whilst the Prosecution has presented both the Book of Evidence that was given to the Defense before the Trial and several Sworn Affidavits for this Appeal Procedure.

 

As such, it is the opinion of the Prosecution, that all factual allegations that are not sustained by an evidence are to be ignored or dismissed by the Court, and only those that bring an evidence to confirm their existence are to be examined by the Court and that, in case of a doubt, the party that has brought an evidence should prevail over the one that has not.

 

IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH;

 

- The Prosecution does hereby request the Court to affirm the Ruling of the Crown v. Tsecsar and dismiss the Appeal of The Crown v. Tsecsar.

 

AND THEREFORE HOPES TO RESTORE JUSTICE IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PROCEDURE.

 

YOURS HUMBLY,

SIR CHARLES GALBRAITH on behalf of THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROVIDENCE

[[Sergi#5457]]

[CasualNuker 1113]

The young Adelheid sits in her bedroom overlooking the fields around her and says aloud to herself  “If they do neit let you go mamej they will have problems they have never seen before.”