Summa, P1, Q1: The Existence of God.

[thesmellypocket 1841]

THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

 

An Instructional Theological Handbook for Beginners. 

 

Comprising the Sum of All the Truths Necessary for Faith and Morals. 

 

Initiated by Bl. Pius of Sutica, FSSCT.

 

Finished by Thomas Williams, FSSCT. 

 

Saint Jude, Pray for Us.

Saint Kristoff, Pray for Us.

Blessed Pius and Seraphim, Pray for Us.

 

 

PREFACE.

 

Most of the credit for this should go to our venerable founder, Blessed Pius of Sutica. I compiled this work, largely based on the notes he had accumulated for it. However, it fell to me to bring it to completion. One of the main differences was that I myself cite Pius many times as an authoritative source, whereas he, not considering himself one of the Church’s great Doctors, would have scrupled to do so. I have not so scrupled, but have enriched these volumes by his teaching.

 

I remain your obedient servant,

 

Brother Thomas Woodbridge, Priestly Fraternity of SS. Kristoff and Jude.
 

 

PRIMA PARS.

QUESTION I. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

 

ARTICLE I. WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD EXISTS?

 

OBJECTION I. It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For the existence of God is an article of faith (see Common Creed, Bl. Jude I), and what is of faith, is belief in the unseen, and therefore can have no demonstration.

 

OBJECTION II. Furthermore, we can only demonstrate the existence of God from His effects, since His actual essence Himself is beyond our reckoning. But since the effects are finite and the cause infinite, it seems that an infinite cause cannot be demonstrated from finite effects, and therefore God’s existence cannot be demonstrated. 

 

ON THE CONTRARY, I ANSWER THAT: “The existence of God…[is] knowable with certainty by the natural light of human reason from the things that He has made.” (Bl. Pius, Tract IV: Fides et Ratio.)

 

Reply to Objection I: The existence of God and other truths about Him are not so much articles of faith, as preambles to the articles. For it is evident that faith presupposes reason. Divine Revelation itself appeals to reason: Owyn used rhetorical questions in his Epistles (Spirit 1:15-17), and God points to His creation as evidence of His power. (Virtue 4:4, etc.) Indeed, a written Revelation itself is something rationally intelligible, and therefore presupposes reason.

 

Furthermore, whilst the submission of faith in the intellect and the will should be given to divinely revealed truths and they should not be subjected to human reason, because they are above it, there still can and should be motives of credibility for believing that these truths have been revealed in the first place. Otherwise there is nothing to distinguish the claims of the Canonist and Rashidun religions, since both claim to be divinely revealed. Hence faith represents a submission of the intellect to the Revealer of a truth beyond its capacity, but it is not a blind submission, but one that has motives of prior credibility. Hence faith and reason are called “The greatest defences of the Church manifested by the Flaming Sword of Owyn” (Saint Sixtus IV, Iustitia Dei in Nostra Aetate) and “The two wings on which we soar ever upward to the contemplation of truth.” (Bl. Pius, Tract IV.)

 

Reply to Objection II: Whilst it is true that no perfect knowledge of an infinite cause can be demonstrated by finite effects, that does not mean that the existence of the cause cannot be demonstrated. We can therefore demonstrate the existence of God from effects; but we cannot know God perfectly in His essence - hence the need for revealed truths.

 

ARTICLE II. WHETHER GOD EXISTS?

 

OBJECTION I. It seems that God does not exist. Because if two contraries exist, the other would be altogether destroyed. But “God” signifies infinite goodness. If God existed, there would therefore be no evil discoverable, but there is evil in the world. Therefore, God does not exist.

 

OBJECTION II. There is no need to suppose God’s existence, for everything we see in this world can be accounted for by other principles. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature (For it cannot be demonstrated that nature has not existed eternally); and all voluntary things to one principle, which is human will, the existence of God is therefore superfluous.

 

ON THE CONTRARY, I ANSWER THAT:  “The most fundamental concept of the True Faith is a rigorous monotheism, called the Doctrine of One. The Creator is architect of the universe and progenitor of humankind. He is unique and inherently one, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent.” (Dogma and Principles of the Church.)

 

And: “God, sometimes called “the Creator,” “Godani,” or “the Lord,” is the single omnipotent, omnipresent, omnibenevolent creator of the universe.” (Catechism of the Canonist Church.)

 

The existence of God can be proven in six ways:

 

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. (For He would be Pure Actuality itself: in the First Mover there would be no distinction between potential and actual.)

 

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

 

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

 

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Bl. Pius. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Pythagoras shows the existence of something supremely true from the observed fact that of two false things one is more false than the other, which means that one is more true than the other. This comparison is based on the nearness to that which is absolutely and supremely true. From these Akritian texts we may further infer that there is something that is supremely being. This we call God. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God. 

 

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

 

The sixth way is the argument from participation, and was given by the Akritian philosopher, Pythagoras. “Consider existence (or being) as a property possessed by objects in themselves. This means that, to determine existence, it would be relative to each object. But this would violate the law of non-contradiction, because then it could be that something exists to one object and not to another one, as existence is only one state at a time; for something cannot simultaneously exist and not exist, and cannot simultaneously be in both the mind and in reality in the same manner. Thus, existence must not be something possessed by objects, but something granted by an object which we call existence, or that possesses existence in its absolute. Now since personality is a positive attribute under being, it must be therefore in some way manifest in the Absolute Being we have inferred. Therefore, God exists as commonly described.”

 

Reply to Objection I: Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good. 

 

As Bl. Fabian the Lesser Wrote: 

 

"One of the more difficult tasks of a theologian in speaking with an unbeliever or a devotee plagued by doubt is justifying the “problem of evil,” in which God permits suffering despite His infinite power, knowledge, and benevolence. This is a vexing task that requires deep study and scholarship. Assuredly, God is infinitely wise and infinitely powerful, for He could not create the world without these abilities, and proof of His might surrounds us every day. This leaves the astute but uneducated pupil only to question His infinite benevolence, a path which too often leads to the sin of denial. Why does the plague afflict virtuous men? Why does the lion hunt gentle creatures like the lamb or the child? Certainly, it is just for God to punish the wicked, but why do the virtuous suffer as well? We cannot deny that the blight is an evil, nor the hunting of men by beasts. And if all things arise from God, have not these as well?

 
     First we must address that while the Lord makes clear to us the nature of virtuous living, and furthermore the nature of sin, we often find these definitions inadequate in describing “evil” as an abstraction. While certainly, to commit sin is to commit evil, not all evils are sinful-- sin arises only from the choices of free willed descendants, and is meaningless in regard to the natural world. Both the beast and the babe cannot sin, because they lack moral judgement. By definition, to sin is to trespass God, and not all evils in the world result from this. Poverty, disease, ignorance, famine, and injurious accident may all transpire without motivation from mortal choice. Likewise, these evils befall the virtuous and the iniquitous alike. Thus, we are engendered to broaden our definition of evil beyond merely the moral evil of sin, but to all suffering and failure, be they manmade or natural.

 
     In this regard the author has found it useful to divide evil into three classifications: moral, physical, and metaphysical. Moral evil is the evil of sin, or trespassing the commands of God, and is the only evil that results in the damnation of its perpetrator. Murder, theft, blasphemy, adultery, and diabolism are all moral evils, and their consequence is punishment in the hereafter. Physical evil is the evil brought into the world by the fall of the descendents to Iblees; the evils such as disease, poverty, mortality, and want, which are spawned by demons, and are a result of the sins of our forefathers. Its consequence is the worldly deprivation of the blessings God granted us, such as food, long life, or beloved friends. Metaphysical evil is the “natural” evil of the world, inherent in its nature. This evil arises from our realm’s distance from God, as decreed by Him. When He rendered the planes, He named that which is with Him the Seventh Sky, that which is farthest the Void, and between them the World. The Lord is perfect, lacking no knowledge or ability. The Void is a place of oblivion and helplessness. Accordingly, the World between contains a mixture of knowledge and ignorance, of ability and inability; men build mighty kingdoms, but each soon falls; they measure the world’s width, but cannot traverse it; they love and are married, but sometimes desire others. This is metaphysical evil, the suffering which comes simply by being unlike God, and its consequence is that we are tested by temptation.

     The existence of a “metaphysical evil” may be somewhat counterintuitive to the layman, as we are aware of the Lord’s infinite benevolence. However, in further defining the three evils, we will find that they are wholly absent in God. He commits no moral evil because moral evil is to choose to trespass the will of God--He cannot trespass His own will. He contains no physical evil because physical evil is to be deprived of the blessings of God--none can deprive the omnipotent Lord. He experiences no metaphysical evil because metaphysical evil is the imperfection of what is distant from Him--God is wholly perfect, and cannot be far from Himself. Thus, these evils arise not because of God, but because we do not fully apprehend Him.

     Through Him, however, we may overcome the threefold sufferings. Through His Virtue, we resist the temptation of moral evil. Through faith, we resist the pains of physical evil. Through nearness to Him in the Skies, we overcome metaphysical evil. By His benevolent nature, any who draw closer to God through virtue will find the pains of life fade, not only in this world, but in the hereafter.” (As Quoted in the Catechism of the Canonist Church.) Hence it is clear that evil is a privation of the Good.

 

Reply to Objection II: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.
 

Edited June 3, 2021 by thesmellypocket